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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Mandatory minimum sentences, once rare in the criminal law 
system, have experienced a dramatic increase in popularity. This 
political phenomenon has enjoyed wide bipartisan support: since the 
mid-1980s, Congress has routinely passed new crime measures 
containing mandatory minimum sentences.1 In spite of the political 
popularity of this sentencing tool, many commentators are concerned 
about the social and economic effects resulting from the proliferation 
of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
has commented that these measures are “perhaps a good example of 
the law of unintended consequences.”2 
                                                                                                                      
 * J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2001; B.A., Economics, University 
of South Florida, 1998. 
 1. See, e.g., Alcohol and Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 
(1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.); 
Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4377 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (2000)). More than one scholar has noted 
that between 1986 and the mid-1990s, Congress passed these measures about every two 
years, or every election year. See, e.g., Carl M. Cannon, America: All Locked Up, NAT’L J., 
Aug. 15, 1998, at 1906.  
 2. William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address (June 18, 1993), in U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, DRUGS & VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INAUGURAL SYMPOSIUM ON 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: JUNE 16-18, 1993, WASHINGTON D.C. 286 
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 The brunt of federal mandatory minimum sentences is aimed at 
drug crimes.3 This trend is mirrored in the states, as many states 
now have mandatory provisions for drug possession.4 The “war on 
drugs” juggernaut has been responsible for incarcerating hundreds of 
thousands of nonviolent, low-level drug offenders.5 Defendants who 
would have received probation twenty years ago now routinely serve 
lengthy prison sentences with no possibility of parole.6 
 The result has been a dramatic increase in the U.S. prison 
population.7 Recent estimates expect the combined federal, state, and 
local incarcerated population to top two million inmates in the year 
2001.8 This is a five-fold increase over the 1972 prison population and 
a rate of incarceration six to ten times higher than in other industrial 
                                                                                                                      
(1993), quoted in BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, FEDERAL JUDICIARY CTR., THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT 
FINDINGS 1 (1994). 
 3. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES]; see also Families Against Mandatory Minimums (2001), at 
http://www.famm.org/about2.htm. The study described in the Commission’s report found 
that drug offenses comprised 91% of all federal mandatory minimum sentences from 
October 1, 1984 to September 30, 1990. See id. According to the study, see id. tbl. 1, at 11-
12, of the federal statutes imposing mandatory minimum sentences, the three most 
commonly used are all aimed at drug offenses. See 21 U.S.C.A § 841 (West Supp. 2001) 
(manufacture and distribution of controlled substances); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1994 & Supp. II) 
(possession of controlled substances); 21 U.S.C.A § 960 (West Supp. 2001) 
(importation/exportation of controlled substances). 
 4. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.01 (McKinney 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
333.7403 (2000 & West Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-31 (2000); see also Ellen 
Perlman, Terms of Imprisonment, GOVERNING, Apr. 2000, at 23, 24, LEXIS, News Library, 
Govern File (listing the following states as having similar provisions: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).  
 5. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, History of Mandatory Sentences 
(2001), at http://www.famm.org/about2.htm. Thirty-six and one-tenth percent of inmates 
meet the Department of Justice’s criteria for low level offenders. Twenty-one and one-half 
percent had no previous incarcerations, no record of violence, and no involvement in 
sophisticated criminal activity. See id.  
 6. See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 1, at 1906 (quoting one federal judge as having 
remarked, “‘This [five year] sentence seems unduly harsh’” before sentencing a 23-year old 
“small time marijuana grower—the kind [of defendant] who once would have qualified for 
an alternative sentencing program”). 
 7. See TARA-JEN AMBROSIO & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, FROM 
CLASSROOMS TO CELL BLOCKS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1997), http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/ 
highernational.html (reporting that while mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug 
crimes are usually pointed to as the root cause of the increase in prison population, other 
“tough on crime” measures such as “three-strikes,” truth-in-sentencing laws, and parole 
abolition have also been responsible). 
 8. See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL 
ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM (draft of May 1999), at http://www.jjic.org/pdf/ 
punishing.pdf (stating that the prison population in 1990 was approximately 1,148,702). 
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nations.9 The United States has now surpassed Russia to become the 
world’s leader in incarceration rate.10 In comparison, the European 
Union, with a combined population of 370 million people, had a 
prison population in 1998 of approximately 300,000.11 The total bill 
for incarcerating these prisoners at the state and federal level was 
estimated to be $41 billion for the year 2000, and approximately $26 
billion was spent incarcerating the nation’s 1.3 million nonviolent 
offenders.12 The increase in incarceration has been labeled “a societal 
commitment to imprisonment on a scale that would have been 
unthinkable a quarter of a century ago.”13 
 Not all jurisdictions have embraced mandatory minimum 
sentences to the same degree. The federal government and certain 
states, including Michigan, New York, and California, have 
historically been cited as examples of criminal justice systems with 
overly harsh mandatory sentencing structures.14 Florida is also 
included in the list of states whose legislators currently embrace 
mandatory sentencing for nonviolent drug offenders.15 Just this past 
year, Florida passed another mandatory sentencing bill, this one 
aimed primarily at ecstasy and other designer drugs.16 
 One particularly ill-conceived Florida mandatory sentencing 
scheme has generated a disproportionate amount of debate. The 
statutes pertaining to the pharmacological painkiller hydrocodone17 
have created considerable confusion, inconsistent opinions, and 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See Neal Pierce, The Prison Boom: 2 Million and Growing, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 6, 
2000, at 3H, 2000 WL 5132250.  
 10. See id. The incarceration rate is the percentage of a country’s population currently 
behind bars. Until recently, nearly every article on prison population had included the 
statement that the United States’ incarceration rate was second only to Russia. See, e.g., 
Harry W. Fenton, Drug War Battle Fatigue, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 112. But see Dita 
Smith, What on Earth?: Behind Bars, WASH. POST June 3, 2000, at A9, 2000 WL 19612398 
(stating that Russia and the United States are now in a virtual tie). 
 11. See VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, AMERICA’S ONE 
MILLION NONVIOLENT PRISONERS (Mar. 1999), http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/onemillion.html. For 
further incarceration rate comparison data, see Smith, supra note 10. The United States 
imprisons 682 individuals per 100,000 of the population. See id. Canada’s incarceration 
rate is 115, Turkey’s is 95, France’s is 90, and Japan’s incarceration rate is just 39. See id. 
 12. See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 5 (citing estimate compiled using 
figures from the Criminal Justice Institute). 
 13. Cannon, supra note 1, at 1907 (quoting Marc Mauer of the Sentencing Project, a 
group that advocates prison alternatives). Mr. Mauer has also labeled the current system 
“an orgy of incarceration.” Id.  
 14. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7403 (2000 & West Supp. 2001); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 220.00-.65 (West 2000). 
 15. See FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (2000) (imposing mandatory minimum sentences for 
violations covering a wide array of illegal substances). 
 16. See Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, ch. 2000-320, sec. 4, § 893.135, 2000 Fla. Laws 3478, 
3490-99 (a recently enacted mandatory provision aimed at various designer drugs).  
 17. See FLA. STAT. § 893.03(2)(a)(1)(j), (3)(c)(4). 
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seemingly excessive sentences for minor drug offenses.18 Illegal 
possession of a relatively small, personal consumption amount of 
hydrocodone subjects violators in Florida to twenty-five year 
mandatory minimum sentences and a $500,000 fine.19 By way of 
comparison, possession of 300 pounds of cocaine results in a 
mandatory minimum sentence of only fifteen years—ten years less 
than illegal possession of an as-prescribed, one-week supply of 
hydrocodone.20 
 This Comment explores such anomalies as well as other 
(presumably) unintended results of mandatory sentencing. Factors in 
the political and social climate that have facilitated their passage 
will also be discussed. Part II provides a brief synopsis of the history 
of mandatory sentencing and recent changes in the sentencing 
system. Part III describes the failure of mandatory minimums to 
meet the intended goals of providing just and certain sentences to 
similarly situated defendants. Part IV outlines the economic 
inefficiencies of mandatory minimum sentences in attaining many of 
their drug- and crime-prevention objectives, investigating both the 
economics of crime rationales and the societal factors that diminish 
the effectiveness of imposing mandatory sentences for drug offenses. 
Part V demonstrates how the calculation of drug weights triggering 
mandatory minimums often leads to inequities in sentencing; 
examples involving cocaine, LSD and, in Florida, the 
pharmacological painkiller hydrocodone illustrate this point. Part VI 
examines the political and social climate that has provided such 
fertile ground for the passage of mandatory sentencing statutes, 
especially the role of the “war on drugs” and public perceptions in 
motivating legislatures to pass these measures. Finally, Part VII 
concludes with observations on this recent sentencing trend. 
II.   THE RISE OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PROVISIONS 
 Mandatory minimum sentences are not a modern development. As 
early as 1790, mandatory minimum sentences existed for piracy and 
murder.21 Other early-American mandatory penalties were imposed 
for refusing to testify before Congress,22 failing to report seaboard 
                                                                                                                      
 18. See Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 1 (Fla. 1999) (listing previous disparate Florida 
hydrocodone decisions).  
 19. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 720 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), quashed, 
Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999). 
 20. See § 893.135(1)(b)(1)(c). 
 21. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States 
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and 
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 186 (1993). 
 22. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 3, at 5. The historical overview 
section of the report notes that there are about a dozen mandatory provisions from the 
1800s still on the books. See id. 
2001]  MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 939 
 
saloon purchases,23 and causing a ship to run aground by use of false 
light.24 Then, as now, these sentences were enacted in response to 
public concern and outrage over well-publicized crimes.25 However, 
until recently mandatory minimums were an uncommon exception to 
the sentencing system, and they did not target entire classes of 
offenses.26 
 In the middle of the twentieth century Congress instituted a 
series of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses.27 In 1951, 
Congress passed a comprehensive narcotics control measure known 
as the Boggs Act.28 The Boggs Act contained mandatory minimum 
sentences for narcotic offenses with no chance for parole or probation 
after the first offense: two years for the first offense, five years for 
the second, and ten years for the third.29 These sentences became 
even harsher through amendments contained in the Narcotics 
Control Act of 1956.30 High levels of drug use and experimentation in 
the 1960s resulted in numerous long prison sentences under the 
Boggs Act.31 In 1970, Congress responded to the concerns of 
prosecutors, wardens, and families of those convicted, repealing 
virtually all provisions imposing mandatory minimum sentences for 
drug violations.32 Congress commented that lengthening prison 
sentences “had not shown the expected overall reduction in drug law 
violations.”33 Among those rallying against these mandatory 
minimums was a freshman Congressman from Texas—who would 
later become a “tough on crime” President—one George Bush, who 
spoke out for “better justice, and more appropriate sentences.”34 
 The movement towards the current state of sentencing for federal 
drug crimes began with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 (SRA).35 In passing the SRA, a bipartisan Congress 
                                                                                                                      
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 5-10; see also Families Against Mandatory Minimums, supra note 5. 
 25. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 3, at 5.  
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-235, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970). 
 29. See id. at 767-768. 
 30. Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567, 568-69 (1956) (repealed 1970) (increasing 
minimum sentences for first and second offenses to five years and 10 years, respectively). 
 31. See Julie Stewart, The Effects of Mandatory Minimums on Families and Society, 
16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 37, 39 (1999). 
 32. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994 & Supp. IV 
1999), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-172, 114 Stat. 7 (2000)); see also Stewart, supra note 
31, at 39. 
 33. S. REP. No. 91-613, at 2 (1969).  
 34. 116 CONG. REC. H33,314 (1970). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
& 28 U.S.C.). 
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fundamentally changed sentencing by rejecting the rehabilitation 
model of punishment.36 The Act announced new objectives:  
 (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to 
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner.37 
 A revolutionary feature of the SRA was its creation of the United 
States Sentencing Commission, an independent expert panel within 
the judicial branch charged with refining sentencing.38 Prior to 1984, 
the federal government employed an indeterminate system, which 
entailed a “three-way sharing” of sentencing responsibilities among 
the branches of government: “Congress defined the maximum, the 
judge imposed a sentence within the statutory range, . . . and the 
Executive Branch’s parole official eventually determined the actual 
duration of imprisonment.”39 The SRA altered the indeterminate 
system by delegating authority to the Sentencing Commission to 
produce guidelines that would promote the SRA’s objectives 
(ensuring certainty in sentencing, eliminating disparity, and 
providing just punishment).40 
 A primary motive for this change was to confirm waning public 
confidence in the criminal justice system by thwarting “soft” judges 
who sentenced culpable criminals too lightly; proponents believed 
they could accomplish this through a compulsory system where 
“similar offenders, committing similar offenses, would be sentenced 
in a similar fashion.”41 It was understood that the guidelines would 
be an evolving, rather than an immediate, fix to the sentencing 
system.42 To help achieve the SRA’s goals, Congress abolished the 
                                                                                                                      
 36. See Hatch, supra note 21, at 188. 
 37. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1989 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)); see also Hatch, supra note 21, at 188 (citing the objectives and 
noting that rehabilitation is explicitly left off the list). 
 38. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994)) 
(providing that the commission is composed of members appointed by the President with 
the Senate’s “advice and consent”); see also Hatch, supra note 21, at 188-89. 
 39. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1989).  
 40. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 3, at 13-15; see also Hatch, 
supra note 21, at 188-89. It was understood that, realistically, the goals of Congress and 
the Commission were “greater fairness and greater honesty, not perfect fairness or perfect 
transparency” in sentencing. Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, An 
Address Before the University of Nebraska College of Law (Nov. 18, 1998), in 11 FED. 
SENTENCING REP. 180, 180 (1999).  
 41. Hatch, supra note 21, at 189. 
 42. See Breyer, supra note 40, at 180. Justice Breyer noted that while the members of 
Congress realized perfection was unascertainable, they “hoped to set in motion a system 
that, through trial and error, could gradually work toward these goals.” Id.  
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federal parole system and made the guidelines compulsory.43 The 
Supreme Court deemed Congress’ delegation of authority to the 
Sentencing Commission constitutional in United States v. Mistretta.44 
 Sentencing guidelines systems have been initiated in the states as 
well. As of 1999, about twenty states have existing or pending 
guideline systems.45 The level of judicial discretion remaining within 
these systems differs by jurisdiction, as state guideline schemes vary 
greatly in their rigidity and complexity.46 Despite the variability, no 
state scheme approaches the intricacy of the highly detailed and 
mechanical federal system.47 
 Two years after enacting the SRA, Congress passed the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA),48 which incorporated a tiered system of 
minimum sentences for crack, powder cocaine, and other commonly 
abused substances based on the quantity of the drugs involved.49 The 
ADAA was passed in the midst of public paranoia and outcry over 
the crack epidemic and the fear of AIDS being spread through drug 
use.50 This political climate led to broad bipartisan support for the 
ADAA, with the bill passing the House by a 392-16 vote and the 
Senate on a voice vote.51 
 Then, in 1988 Congress created an even more comprehensive set 
of quantity-based mandatory minimums for drug offenses by passing 
the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (OADAA).52 A significant 
aspect of the OADDA was the application of mandatory penalties to 
“conspiracies” to distribute or import drugs, regardless of the 
defendant’s level of culpable involvement.53 This measure—designed 
to catch drug kingpins, who rarely have large quantities of drugs in 
                                                                                                                      
 43. See 28 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Hatch, supra note 21, at 
189; Breyer, supra note 40, at 180; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367 (noting the congressional 
Judiciary Committee considered and rejected a system of guidelines that were merely 
advisory). 
 44. 488 U.S. at 374. 
 45. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.001 (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.34 (2000); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.10 (2000); see also Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in 
Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. 
SENTENCING REP. 69, 70 (1999). Numerous state guidelines systems preceded the federal 
guidelines. See id. Additional information about state sentencing guidelines may be 
accessed through the National Association of Sentencing Commission’s web page at 
http://www.ussc.gov/states/. 
 46. See Frase, supra note 45, at 69.  
 47. See id.  
 48. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18, 21, & 31 of the U.S. Code). 
 49. Id. at 3207-2 to 3207-4.  
 50. See DAVID F. MUSTO, M.D., THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC 
CONTROL 274 (Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1999). 
 51. See Cannon, supra note 1, at 1913. 
 52. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4377 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 846, 963 (1994)). 
 53. See id.; see also MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that 
the penalties could now apply equally to a major distributor and a low-level participant). 
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their possession—has been criticized for being more routinely used 
against low-level drug dealers, look-outs, and peripheral conspirators 
such as the girlfriends of drug dealers.54 
 The ADAA was passed before the Sentencing Commission’s first 
set of guidelines were implemented—and the statutorily mandated 
sentences were then incorporated into the guideline terms.55 This 
slate of legislatively mandated drug sentences has been likened to an 
early “no confidence vote” in the Sentencing Commission and its 
forthcoming sentencing guidelines.56 Justice Breyer, who was a 
member of the original Sentencing Commission, has also commented 
that “statutory mandatory sentences prevent the Commission from 
carrying out its basic, congressionally mandated task: the 
development, in part through research, of a rational, coherent set of 
punishments.”57 In spite of these observations, both federal and state 
legislatures have continued to use this sentencing method. They have 
routinely added new mandatory provisions and enhanced old ones 
throughout the past decade. 
III.   CREATING UNIFORMITY IN SENTENCING? 
 There is little doubt that some of the concerns motivating the 
creation of mandatory minimum sentencing structures are 
legitimate. Before the widespread use of these structures, federal 
studies showed that the sentences of drug defendants could vary 
greatly depending on the geographical location and the sentencing 
judge.58 Congress wished to remove these disparities, preclude what 
they perceived as soft sentences, and alleviate concerns that some 
                                                                                                                      
 54. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., In the Drug Wars, Small Minds Go After Small Fry, 
CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 23, 1993, at 14. Taylor discusses the story of Nicole Richardson, a 20-
year college student from Alabama who was found guilty of conspiracy after giving her 
LSD dealer boyfriend’s phone number to an informant. Nicole cooperated with the DEA 
but had no real information to give due to her peripheral involvement. She received the 
mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, while her boyfriend, clearly more culpable, 
received only a 5-year sentence since he had information of value to the prosecutors. See 
also Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Victims of MMS (2000), at 
http://www.famm.org/ 
victims.htm (discussing numerous similar stories). 
 55. See VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 3. 
 56. Francesca D. Bowman, Taking the Lead, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 32, 32 (1995). 
The federal sentencing guidelines are fettered by the requirement of incorporating the 
mandatory minimum sentencing terms into the terms of the guideline, and the result is a 
guideline system that is significantly harsher than the one originally advocated. See id. 
This prompted Ms. Bowman to insist that Congress should allow the experts at the 
Commission to guide policy or admit that the Commission is nothing more than “expensive 
window dressing.” Id. at 33. 
 57. Breyer, supra note 40, at 184. From 1985 to 1989, Justice Breyer was a member of 
the original Sentencing Commission under Judge Billy Wilkins. See id. at 180. 
 58. See id.  
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differences in sentences might be racially motivated.59 Creating a 
system under which the appropriate sentence was predetermined 
would ensure the certainty and just punishment that Congress was 
seeking.60 Nevertheless, numerous studies and commentators have 
concluded that mandatory sentencing has failed to alleviate 
sentencing disparities; in certain areas, mandatory sentencing has 
even exacerbated the problem.61 
 One main criticism of mandatory minimum sentencing is that 
such provisions remove discretion traditionally held by “neutral” 
judges and transfers it to “adversarial” prosecutors.62 Judges are 
handcuffed by the mandatory provisions and must impose the 
statutorily authorized sentence regardless of the culpable level of 
conduct involved.63 What discretion is left in the system is in the 
hands of prosecutors.64 Prosecutors can use their discretion in 
fashioning what they determine to be the appropriate charge, and 
they alone may initiate a motion for reduction of sentence based on 
the defendant’s “substantial assistance.”65 While a judge’s sentencing 
actions are in the public view, the charging discretion of prosecutors 
is a behind-the-scenes, secretive process. 
 Sentence reduction for cooperation subsequent to arrest may 
result in a seemingly inequitable condition, which confutes the just 
sentencing goals of mandatory minimums. Those who are most able 
to offer the requisite “substantial assistance” to prosecutors—and 
receive substantial sentence reductions in return—are high-level, 
culpable operatives in the drug business.66 Lookouts, messengers, 
and other underlings in the enterprise, who have little valuable 
information to offer, end up receiving the full mandatory minimum 
sentence.67 This phenomenon—highly culpable individuals receiving 
                                                                                                                      
 59. See id. Concerns about the statistically disproportionate sentences African-
American defendants received in many instances led to initial support of mandatory 
minimums by the Congressional Black Caucus. 
 60. See Hatch, supra note 21, at 188-89. 
 61. See VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 23-24.  
 62. See id. at 21. 
 63. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 199, 202-03 (1993). 
 64. See id. 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 
2, at 21. 
 66. See United States v. Musser, 856 F.2d 1484, 1486-87 (11th Cir. 1988); see also 
VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 21; Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 211-12. 
 67. See Musser, 856 F.2d at 1486-87; see also VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 21; 
Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 211-12. “This result makes nonsense of the intuitively 
plausible scale of punishments that Congress and the ordinary person envisage when they 
think of sentences linked to drug quantity or other hallmarks of the most serious criminal 
responsibility.” Id. at 213. 
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shorter sentences than their peripheral co-conspirators—has been 
aptly labeled the “cooperation paradox”68 and “inverted sentencing.”69 
 The goal of ensuring uniformity in sentencing along racial lines 
has produced disconcerting results; studies show that mandatory 
minimum sentences “have had a disparate impact on nonwhite 
offenders.”70 In fact, the disparity in sentence lengths between blacks 
and other offenders has increased since the enactment of mandatory 
drug penalties.71 Studies offer two main explanations for the 
disparity: Whites are more likely to plead guilty earlier in the 
process for a lesser charge, and they are more likely to provide 
“substantial assistance.”72 
 However, the drafting of certain statutes has directly led to this 
racially unbalanced result as well. For example, the disparate 
treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenders in the federal 
system and its disproportionate impact on African-American 
defendants has been the source of much critical analysis and 
debate.73 Crack is typically found in minority communities, while 
powder cocaine is perceived as a “suburban” drug.74 Possession of 
only five grams of crack cocaine triggers a five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence, while it takes 500 grams of powder cocaine to 
trigger the same five-year sentence.75 Five grams of crack cocaine 
could be “a weekend supply to a serious abuser.”76 Most experts agree 
that there is no sound basis for the 100 to 1 ratio between crack and 
cocaine, yet the difference and its lopsided effect remain; over 88% of 
those arrested for possession of crack are African-American.77 
Additionally, while 76% of drug users are white, African-Americans 
comprise 35% of all drug arrests, 55% of all drug convictions, and 
74% of all drug sentences.78 
                                                                                                                      
 68. Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 211.  
 69. United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hat makes the 
post-discount sentencing structure topsy-turvy is the mandatory minimum, binding only 
for the hangers on. What is to be said for such terms, which can visit draconian penalties 
on the small fry without increasing prosecutors’ ability to wring information from their 
bosses?”). 
 70. VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 23. 
 71. See id. at 23-24. 
 72. See id.  
 73. See, e.g., Carol A. Bergman, The Politics of Federal Sentencing on Cocaine, 10 
FED. SENTENCING REP. 196 (1998). 
 74. See, e.g., George Cornell, Editorial, Don’t Neglect Treatment, PATRIOT-NEWS, Apr. 
4, 1999, Westlaw, 1999 WL 5134078.  
 75. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 76. VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 23. 
 77. See Bergman, supra note 73, at 196; see also Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got To 
Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing 
the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 28 (1997) (stating 
that the crack/cocaine sentencing distinction “fl[ies] in the face of expert opinion”). 
 78. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK 
AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 12 (1995). 
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IV.   MANDATORY PROVISIONS: INEFFICIENT AT ATTAINING DRUG AND 
CRIME PREVENTION GOALS 
A.   Economics and Sentencing 
 Another leading critique of aiming mandatory minimum 
sentences at nonviolent drug offenders is that the results do not 
justify the huge economic expenditures and social costs. Economists 
view criminal behavior as an attempt by individuals to maximize 
their utility (that is, satisfaction, well-being, or expected benefit) 
given their options, both legal and illegal.79 Before engaging in 
criminal activity, an actor will (consciously or subconsciously) 
balance his expected benefits, which include monetary gains and 
psychological satisfaction, against the potential negatives, which 
include legal sanctions, lost legal income, and the personal 
embarrassment of being apprehended.80 Therefore, according to 
economists, individuals engage in criminal behavior only when the 
expected benefits outweigh the potential costs.81 
 Policymakers employ this economic theory of crime to formulate 
enforcement policy, altering certain variables to raise the costs to the 
criminal.82 Three important variables of this type are the probability 
of being apprehended, the probability of conviction if apprehended, 
and the severity of punishment.83 Mandatory minimum sentences 
obviously achieve the goal of severity of punishment; they also raise 
the likelihood of conviction, since defendants are now more likely to 
plead to a charge rather than face prosecution and risk the 
                                                                                                                      
 79. See DAVID W. RASSMUSSEN & BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ECONOMIC ANATOMY OF A 
DRUG WAR: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE COMMONS 41 (1994); cf. MAUER & HULING, supra 
note 78 (noting that while economic analysis helps to understand criminal behavior and to 
formulate crime prevention policies, economic analysis should not be considered an 
exclusive factor, as psychological and sociological factors also play a vital role in the 
research of criminal behavior). 
 80. See RASSMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note 79; see also Isaac Ehrlich, Crime 
Punishment and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43, 46 (1996), for an 
elaboration on a individual’s decision to participate in an illegal activity: the net return for 
the offense (n), equals the gross return of the offense (g) minus the direct costs of the 
offense (including the cost of self-protection) (c), minus forgone wages from a legal activity 
(l), minus [the probability of apprehension and conviction (a) multiplied by the prospective 
penalty if convicted (p)]; or: n = g – c – l – (ap).  
 Additionally, this theoretical model assumes the individual is crime neutral; however, an 
individual’s preferences pertaining to crime, moral values, and risk weighs on the decision 
to engage in a criminal activity. See id. at 46; see also Samuel Kramer, Comment, An 
Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of 
Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398, 405 n.31 (1990) (noting that “[p]sychic 
benefits are notoriously difficult to quantify, but play an indispensable role in our criminal 
justice system”). 
 81. See RASSMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note 79, at 41. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id.  
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mandatory sentence.84 This economic rationale, coupled with a desire 
for vigilant law enforcement and apprehension of drug traffickers, 
sellers, and users, is embedded in our current drug enforcement 
agenda.85 
 However, the effectiveness of such drug enforcement policies is 
countered by several factors. First, more severe sentences do not 
proportionately add deterrence benefits. Second, potential deterrence 
and crime reduction benefits are further limited by sociological 
factors inherent in the drug culture, including the greatly diminished 
capacity of addicts to react to negative stimuli. Finally, money spent 
trying to incarcerate our way to a drug war victory is redirecting 
dollars from other areas, including policing, drug prevention and 
treatment, and social programs. 
B.   Certainty v. Severity in Sentencing 
 The severe penalties in mandatory minimum provisions are 
designed both to incapacitate the violator and to serve as a general 
deterrent against future violations.86 After it was well established 
that raising the costs to the offender reduces crime, it was still an 
open question as to how great a factor increasing the severity of 
punishment actually was in deterring crime.87 In the past decade, 
several studies have established that certainty of punishment 
(likelihood of apprehension and conviction) is a far more significant 
factor.88 Professor Grogger’s comments in his statistical analysis of 
California criminal offenders sums up the stance of most experts: 
“The results point to large deterrent effects emanating from 
increased certainty of punishment, and much smaller, and generally 
insignificant effects, stemming from increased severity of sanction.”89 
 Additionally, the RAND Drug Policy Research Center analysis—
perhaps the most exhaustive study done on mandatory minimums 
                                                                                                                      
 84. See Hatch, supra note 21, at 191 (“Discretionary decisions by prosecutors, 
regarding both charges and factual allegations, can powerfully expand or limit a judge’s 
sentencing boundaries. This increased leverage, in turn, promotes ‘hidden bargaining,’ 
wherein prosecutors and defense attorneys manipulate the guidelines in order to induce 
pleas necessary to keep the system working.”). But see Breyer, supra note 40, at 183 
(noting, however, that the certainty of the guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences 
might have induced “prosecutors to want to bargain less while defendants want to bargain 
more”). 
 85. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CENTER, 
MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’ 
MONEY? 75 (1997). 
 86. See Breyer, supra note 40, at 181. 
 87. See WILLIAM A. LUKSETICH & MICHAEL D. WHITE, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN 
ECONOMIC APPROACH 85-86 (1982). 
 88. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 75; Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity 
of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 297, 308 (1991) (including a citation to a 1980 study 
conducted by Ann Witte). 
 89. Grogger, supra note 88, at 308. 
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for drug crimes—found such minimums to be less cost-efficient than 
either conventional enforcement or treatment at reducing both drug-
related crime and drug consumption.90 RAND confirmed that shorter 
sentences combined with vigilant policing is dollar for dollar a wiser 
policy than long sentences: 
[E]xtending sentences for all drug dealers is less cost-effective 
than expanding the scope of conventional enforcement by arresting 
and prosecuting more dealers under traditional sentencing laws. 
Thus, if the objective is to increase the stringency of drug 
enforcement in a manner that maximizes the benefits obtained per 
dollar spent, expanding conventional-enforcement budgets is 
preferable to passing laws increasing sentence length.91 
 Other studies have reached a similar conclusion. For example, the 
Federal Judicial Center’s evaluation of the general deterrence effect 
of mandatory minimum drug laws concluded that “the weight of the 
evidence clearly shows that enactment of mandatory penalties has 
either no demonstrable . . . effects or short-term effects that rapidly 
waste away.”92 A National Academy of Sciences Panel (NASP) 
determined that tripling the average length of incarceration between 
1975 and 1989 barely impacted the crime rate.93 NASP also 
determined further increases would result in even smaller effects.94 A 
comment of Professor Grogger bears reiterating: “These findings . . . 
call into question the economic rationality of a sanctioning strategy 
based on increasingly lengthy prison terms as a means of reducing 
crime.”95 
C.   Factors Undermining the Legislative Intent of 
Mandatory Minimums 
 State and federal legislatures intend for mandatory minimum 
sentences to be an important weapon in the war on drugs: “The 
theory behind these laws was that if potential felons knew in 
advance that the penalty for certain crimes was a long prison 
                                                                                                                      
 90. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 68-69 (discussing the ability of treatment 
and other methods to curtail various types of crimes); see id. at 44 (discussing the ability of 
mandatory minimums to limit drug consumption, using cocaine as an example). 
“Conventional Enforcement” is defined as sentences served by prisoners exiting in 1990. 
Id. at 28. 
 91. Id. at 75. 
 92. VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 11 (quoting Professor Michael Tonry). 
 93. See Beale, supra note 77, at 26.  
 94. See id.  
 95. Grogger, supra note 88, at 308; see also Laura Mansnerus, As Crime Rate Drops, 
the Prison Rate Rises and the Debate Rages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, at 14NJ, LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File (indicating “criminologists say the question of whether tough 
sentencing depresses the crime rate is unanswerable, although the consensus is that it 
does not”). 
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sentence or death, they would think carefully and refrain from 
violating the law.”96 Yet, many variables—including the target 
population of these measures—were likely not fully considered. 
 One factor that diminishes the deterrent effect of mandatory 
sentencing becomes apparent once it is realized that economic crime 
deterrent theories are modeled on persons who act “rationally.”97 
Many crimes, “crimes of passion” being a leading example, are simply 
not rational—they are therefore not subject to the deterrence effect of 
harsh punishments.98 Many drug crimes also experience limited 
deterrent effect from mandatory minimum provisions. Drug 
addiction diminishes the user’s response to negative stimuli; addicts, 
in order to supply their addiction, are often willing to risk 
victimization, predatory crimes, overdose, toxicity and impurities in 
the drug, and the transmission of diseases.99 It follows that it is 
nonsensical to attempt to deter this group through severe mandatory 
sentences.  
 Yet the overwhelming majority of mandatory minimum sentences 
are levied against drug defendants. Many of those charged as drug 
dealers are, in fact, drug users. For example, three-fourths of those 
individuals arrested for selling cocaine use the drug themselves.100 
The RAND study confirmed the general ineffectiveness of mandatory 
minimum sentences against drug users and drug-related crime; 
when dealing with such a target population, there is “very little 
difference between conventional enforcement and mandatory 
minimums in their effects on . . . economically motivated [drug] 
crime[s].”101 
 Other characteristics of the drug culture in addition to addiction 
work to limit the deterrent effect of long drug sentences. Drug 
dealers, who are typically young males, tend to think of potential 
outcomes in the near term; they are more apt than other members of 
society to prefer short-term rewards and downplay future 
consequences.102 Those most likely to be apprehended are young, 
street-level operatives who do not engage in a concerned analysis of 
the potential lengthy sanctions as envisioned by Congress.103 Instead, 
this group tends to “act impulsively, without forethought. . . . They 
                                                                                                                      
 96. LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
MANDATORY SENTENCING 62 (1994). 
 97. LUKSETICH & WHITE, supra note 87, at 57. The word “rational” is defined as 
behaving in a manner to maximize personal satisfaction, not acting within community 
norms or psychological definitions of rational. Id. 
 98. See Kramer, supra note 80, at 405 n.32.  
 99. See RASSMUSSEN & BENSON, supra note 79, at 53-54; cf. CAULKINS ET AL., supra 
note 85, at 65 (discussing the irrationality of psycho-pharmacological crime). 
 100. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 86. 
 101. Id. at 68. 
 102. See id. at 98.  
 103. See FORER, supra note 96, at 62. 
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think they can beat the law.”104 As the Federal Judiciary Center 
(FJC) noted in its report on mandatory minimums: “To be deterred, 
offenders must stop to weigh the costs and benefits, be aware of the 
penalties, find those penalties intolerable, and have other more 
attractive options.”105 Therefore, young, impoverished, inner-city 
drug dealers, who perceive few legitimate alternatives as compared 
to the large, immediate returns from dealing, are not as likely to be 
discouraged by mandatory minimum sentences.  
 The FJC report found that in addition to addicts and low-level 
dealers, drug traffickers may also not be susceptible to the 
deterrence theory.106 The report also noted that even if some drug 
dealers and traffickers are deterred, as well as others being 
sentenced to long mandatory minimum sentences, the overall 
curtailment effect is virtually negated when there are countless 
others ready to take their place, as is the case in the lucrative illegal 
drug business.107 
D.   Allocating Resources to the Big Business of Corrections 
 Another subsidiary economic effect of the war on drugs has been 
the expansion of the prison industry, which has been dubbed the past 
decade’s “major public works project and social program.”108 To 
accommodate the drastic increase in prison population, 168 state and 
forty-five federal prisons were constructed between 1990 and 1995.109 
Total costs for constructing state prisons in 1997 were $3.4 billion, 
most of which was financed through long-term bonds whose total 
debt payments will eventually raise that figure considerably.110 New 
prisons can be an economic boon to an area, and many locations—
typically rural counties—covet correctional institutions for the jobs 
and dollars they bring to the community.111 The big business of 
operating prisons has also attracted the private sector: the nation’s 
largest private prison firm, Corrections Corporation of America, 
operates seventy-eight prisons located in twenty-five states.112 
                                                                                                                      
 104. Id. at 62; see also CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 98. 
 105. VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 11; see also FORER, supra note 96, at 62. As an 
ex-judge, Forer notes the realities of the application of these sentences: “The [deterrent] 
theory behind these laws was . . . patently fallacious.” Id. 
 106. See VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 11. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Press Release, Justice Policy Institute, Two Million Americans Will Be Behind 
Bars on February 15 (Jan. 24, 1999) (on file with author).  
 109. See Cannon, supra note 1, at 1907. 
 110. See SCHIRALDI ET AL., supra note 11. 
 111. See Cannon, supra note 1, at 1907-08 (“Rural counties covet them the way they 
once did Japanese auto plants.”); see also Bill Sizemore, New Prisons Bring Much Needed 
Jobs, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 7, 2000, at A6, 2000 WL 5114929.  
 112. See Cannon, supra note 1, at 1908. 
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 Considerably greater than the construction costs are the annual 
incarceration costs. On average, it costs approximately $20,000 a 
year to confine a state inmate and $24,000 to confine a federal 
inmate.113 According to the Justice Policy Institute, the total bill for 
incarcerating the nation’s two million inmates—which includes the 
1.2 million nonviolent inmates—was expected to reach $40 billion in 
2000.114 
 Hidden costs, such as health care and contracted services, may 
raise these figures as well. For example, Florida spent $230 million 
on prisoner health care last year, amounting to roughly one-fifth of 
the state’s prison budget.115 Additionally, the overabundance of 
mandatory minimum sentences carrying long-term penalties will 
eventually create an older prison population, resulting in an increase 
in the cost of health care in the prison system.116 In Florida, for 
example, health care costs for prisoners over fifty are estimated to be 
three times that of a younger inmate.117 The state legislature recently 
responded to the growing elderly prison population by passing a law 
creating a “geriatric prison” in Chattahoochee, Florida.118 One Florida 
newspaper editorial commented on the new prison: 
 With ever-tougher mandatory sentencing laws, more and more 
inmates are going to be growing old and spending their “golden” 
years behind bars. . . . Conventional wisdom has held that once 
offenders reached a certain age, they become significantly less 
likely to commit new crimes or pose a danger to society and, thus, 
are better candidates for release. But the lock-em-up-and-throw-
away-the-key mentality has overtaken that rationale.119 
 The money financing the construction and operation of these 
prisons comes at the expense of other programs. Prison funding 
limits spending for treatment and other policing strategies with 
proven track records.120 The trend in state and federal criminal 
justice system budgets has been the allocation of larger portions of 
                                                                                                                      
 113. See SCHIRALDI ET AL., supra note 11. 
 114. See JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 8. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See AMBROSIO & SCHIRALDI, supra note 7 (estimating that the “[a]verage cost of 
incarcerating an elderly (55+) state inmate” costs $69,000 annually). 
 117. See Mark Hollis, Lawmakers Revive Talk of Prison for Elderly: As the Number of 
Inmates Older than 50 Grows, So Do Concerns About the Cost of Incarcerating Them, 
ORLANDO SENT., Jan. 4, 2000, at D1, 2000 WL 3569755.  
 118. See Act effective July 1, 2000, ch. 2000-214, 2000 Fla. Laws 2148 (amending FLA. 
STAT. §§ 120.81, 413.051, 414.40, 944.02 (2000); creating FLA. STAT. §§ 944.804, 944.8041 
(2000)); see also Editorial, Lock-Up Condos, LEDGER, June 16, 2000, at A12, LEXIS, News 
Library, LAKELD File (calling Governor Bush’s signing of the bill creating Florida’s 
geriatric prison “a sign of the times,” as prisoners over 50 are the fastest growing inmate 
population). 
 119. Editorial, supra note 118. 
 120. See AMBROSIO & SCHIRALDI, supra note 7. 
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funding for prisons and smaller portions of funding for policing.121 
This trend is directly contrary to the data suggesting conventional 
police enforcement is considerably more efficient at curtailing drug 
proliferation than lengthy incarceration.122 Many involved in the 
corrections field also contend that legislatures are allotting money to 
prisons that should be used on more cost-effective crime solutions 
and social programs.123 
 In 1994, Senator Paul Simon’s Subcommittee on the Constitution 
conducted a national survey of prison wardens, finding that the 
wardens were in opposition to the current “tough on crime” 
policies.124 The wardens favored smarter use of resources, an end to 
mandatory minimum sentences, and a greater use of alternatives to 
prison.125 Astonishingly, the wardens stated that half the inmates 
under their supervision pose no serious physical threat to society.126 
The wardens were also opposed to longer sentences for minor drug 
offenses and the continued construction of new prisons.127 
 Programs unrelated to the criminal justice system have had their 
budgets slashed as prison budgets grow.128 Between 1987 and 1998, 
while corrections spending increased 30%, there was an 18.2% 
decrease in higher education budgets.129 In 1995, for the first time 
ever, the states spent more on building prisons than colleges.130 
While President Clinton touted that spending large sums of money 
“[would] ensure that all Americans have the best education in the 
world,” the states funded prisons to the detriment of education.131 
 Florida has been cited as “another example of a state whose 
policies have taken a turn for the worst.”132 In 1994 the Florida 
                                                                                                                      
 121. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, WALL ST. J., March 
12, 1999, at A14, 1999 WL 5444197 (citing a 1999 Rockefeller Institute of Government 
study that showed 52% of the total 1983 U.S. criminal justice budget was allocated to 
police, while 28% was allocated to corrections; by 1995 the numbers were 43% to police and 
37% to corrections, respectively). 
 122. See generally CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 75. 
 123. See AMBROSIO & SCHIRALDI, supra note 7. 
 124. See id. Eighty-five percent of the wardens surveyed felt that elected officials are 
not offering effective solutions to the country’s crime problems, and 92% said that there 
should be greater use of alternatives to incarceration. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. As the overwhelming majority of wardens agreed that elected officials do 
not provide effective solutions to country’s crime problem, Senator Simon stated “It’s time 
for a reality check on what works and what doesn’t in fighting crime. . . . Some of these 
tough-sounding answers are just making things worse.” Wardens Oppose More Prisons, 
Longer Sentences, Survey Shows; Results Prove ‘Contract’ Is Misguided Group Says, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 1994, at A3, 1994 WL 6348534 [hereinafter Wardens Oppose Prisons]. 
 127. See Wardens Oppose Prisons, supra note 126.  
 128. See Cannon, supra note 1, at 1915. 
 129. See AMBROSIO & SCHIRALDI, supra note 7 (focusing just on the 1980s, the numbers 
are more dramatic: a 95% increase in corrections and a 6% decrease in education). 
 130. See SCHIRALDI ET AL., supra note 11. 
 131. AMBROSIO & SCHIRALDI, supra note 7. 
 132. Id. 
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Council of 100 issued some sage, though unheeded advice, noting 
that appropriate public policy “will combine effective, cost-efficient 
reforms in criminal justice with investments in the state’s future. 
Only if criminal justice expenditures are made efficiently, will 
resources be available for critical investments in prevention, 
intervention and education.”133 Nevertheless, in prioritizing its 
expenditures, Florida has joined the long list of states that spend 
more on corrections than higher education; meanwhile, its university 
system has experienced a perceptible decline in quality.134 In this 
mad dash to increase prison capacity through new facilities, 
maintenance at existing facilities is often neglected.135 A common 
complaint is that “Florida politicians give lip service to preventing 
children from becoming criminals, but not much money or effort.”136 
With a huge influx of “baby-boom echo” students arriving at the 
state’s universities in the near future, the legislature should heed the 
concerns of those who argue for the replacement of today’s spending 
trends with an investment in their future.137 
 Society has a finite amount of resources available to benefit its 
citizens. Within drug and crime fighting budgets, as well as in 
general government apportionments, wise—and admittedly often 
difficult—decisions must be made for the allotment of tax-dollars. 
Currently, however, there is strong evidence that a disproportionate 
amount of these resources is being spent on operating prisons and 
incarcerating nonviolent and low-level drug dealers. 
V.   THE CALCULATION OF DRUG WEIGHTS 
 Mandatory minimum sentences often create seemingly 
unconscionable anomalies in prison sentences. Such anomalies are 
the result of either poorly drafted or poorly contemplated statutes 
that evidence a lack of comprehension of the realities of drug 
                                                                                                                      
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. Many have lamented Florida’s choice of priorities:  
[T]his state’s system of higher education also has dropped in prestige. By the 
late 1980s, Florida’s state universities had improved so much they attracted 
national attention, and were rated well above average. Since then, with state 
tax support plummeting and high-quality professors fleeing, the system at first 
stagnated and then drifted downward. . . . [T]his issue ought to receive the 
same high profile that criminal justice has had in recent years.  
Editorial, Forecast of Higher Education’s Woes Includes Good, Bad Plans of Attack, FT. 
LAUD. SUN SENT., Jan. 21, 1996, at 4G, LEXIS, News Library, SUNSEN File. 
 135. See Jay Croft, New Prisons Built, Older Ones Slighted, PALM BCH. POST, Apr. 2, 
1995, at 1A, LEXIS, News Library, PBPST File. 
 136. Editorial, Prisons No Cure For Young Criminals, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Jan. 16, 
1995, at 6A, LEXIS, News Library, SUNSEN File. (“Mostly, [the politicians’] anti-crime 
focus is to build prisons with tax funds because steel bars are immensely popular with 
voters.”). 
 137. See Editorial, supra note 134, at 4G. 
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smuggling, distribution, and use.138 A prime example is offered by 
statutes imposing mandatory minimum sentences triggered by the 
total weight of the entire “mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount” of the illegal drug, rather than simply the weight 
of the illegal drug contained in the mixture or substance.139 
Consequently, the courts have been left to address how this statutory 
language applies to a variety of controlled substances. 
A.   Cocaine 
 The creative methods used by drug smugglers have led to peculiar 
cases involving mixtures containing cocaine; the cases are varied in 
their holdings. In United States v. Restrepo-Contreras,140 the 
defendants were apprehended at San Juan Airport with eleven 
souvenir statues made out of cocaine mixed with beeswax.141 The 
district court determined the cocaine and beeswax comprising the 
statues to be a “mixture,” and the defendants appealed the resulting 
sentence.142 The First Circuit held that the district court properly 
determined that the entire weight of the souvenirs—the cocaine plus 
the beeswax—should be counted towards the weight that triggers the 
mandatory sentence.143 The First Circuit also affirmed the sentence 
of a man traveling with two “suitcases,” which were made of a 
combination of acrylic suitcase material and cocaine bonded 
together.144 The First Circuit held that in imposing a mandatory 
minimum sentence, the district court properly determined the 
calculable drug weight to include the entire weight of the suitcase, 
minus the metal parts.145 Cases involving cocaine mixed with 
cornmeal146 and cocaine mixed with boric acid147 have also resulted in 
the weight of the noncontrolled substance being disallowed from the 
total weight calculated for sentencing.148 Conversely, cocaine mixed 
in bottles of wine or liquor has not been calculated on a total-weight-
of-the-mixture basis.149 
                                                                                                                      
 138. See FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (2000). 
 139. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also FLA. STAT. § 
893.135(1)(c)(1) (2000). 
 140. 942 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 141. Id. at 97.  
 142. Id. at 98.  
 143. See id. at 99. 
 144. See United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623, 626 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 145. See id. at 625-26. 
 146. See United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387, 1387 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 147. See United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1000 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 148. See id.  
 149. See United States v. Bristol, 964 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding the 
weight of wine mixed with cocaine should not be included); see also United States v. 
Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding the weight of creme liquor containing 
imported cocaine should not be included); United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 
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 The rule of lenity has been applied to 21 U.S.C. § 841 to avoid the 
absurd and irrational result that occurs by including the weight of a 
mixture with a controlled substance.150 The rationale is that the 
failure to do so would result in divergent and disproportionate 
sentences, which are contrary to the “uniformity in sentencing” and 
“just punishment” purposes of the sentencing guidelines and 
mandatory minimum sentences.151 Nonetheless, as cases involving a 
variety of substances—including LSD—indicate, this logic has been 
far from universally embraced.152 
B.   LSD 
 Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is another controlled substance 
carrying a mandatory minimum sentencing provision that has 
engendered considerable debate and disparity in the courts.153 Since 
a dose of LSD is so small, it must be sold in combination with a 
carrier.154 Examples of common carriers include small pieces of 
blotter paper, gelatin capsules, or sugar cubes.155 When combined 
with a carrier, the actual LSD comprises an extremely small part of 
the combined drug product’s weight.156 The weight of the carrier 
medium and, therefore, the applicable penalty can vary 
considerably.157 
 In Chapman v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the 
prosecution’s contention that the combined weight of the paper and 
LSD should be used to calculate the sentence.158 The Court 
determined the paper was a “mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount of [LSD].”159 The weight of the pure LSD in 
Chapman’s possession was fifty milligrams, but the combined LSD 
and blotter paper weight was 5.7 grams, enough to trigger a 
                                                                                                                      
1238 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding the weight of a liquid substance containing semi-dissolved 
cocaine should not be included).  
 150. See Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1237. But see Chapman v. United States, 500 
U.S. 453, 463-64 (1991) (“The rule of leniency . . . is not applicable unless there is a 
‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act.’”).  
 151. See Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1235. 
 152. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463-64 (1991). 
 153. See id. at 458 n.2, 461-63. 
 154. See id. at 457. 
 155. See id.  
 156. See id.  
 157. See id. at 458. The weight of 100 doses of LSD on sugar cubes is 227 grams, and 
on blotter paper only 1.4 grams, while the weight of 100 doses of pure LSD is only 5 
milligrams. See id. at 458 n.2. Even the weight of blotter paper can vary greatly. LSD 
weighing over one gram requires a five-year sentence, while 10 grams requires a 10-year 
sentence, irrespective of the total number of doses. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v), 
(b)(1)(B)(v) (1994 & Supp. V 1999), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-172, 114 Stat. 9 (2000). 
 158. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 469. 
 159. Id. at 455, 461 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v)).  
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mandatory five-year sentence.160 Chapman argued that the weight of 
the carrier was an arbitrary factor that should be excluded from the 
sentence calculation, that “mixture or substance” is impermissibly 
vague, and that due process and constitutional considerations 
required the exclusion of the carrier-weight.161 
 The majority of the Court held that the blotter paper used to 
distribute LSD was a “mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount” of the drug.162 Since the statute and the guidelines failed to 
define “mixture,” it was sufficient to give the word its ordinary, 
dictionary meaning.163 The Court also cast aside Chapman’s 
constitutional arguments, deeming the statute not arbitrary. The 
Court held it was rational for Congress to include the weight of the 
paper, given the congressional intent to punish large-volume drug 
operatives and the fact that blotter paper is the “chosen tool of the 
trade for those trafficking in LSD.”164 In addition, the statute was 
neither a violation of due process nor unconstitutionally vague, since 
“plausible arguments against describing blotter paper impregnated 
with LSD as a ‘mixture or substance’” were not enough to render the 
statute vague.165 
 Many thought that including the carrier weight on a substance 
that is sold by dose, instead of by weight as heroin and cocaine are 
sold, produced a seemingly irrational and harsh result.166 As Justice 
Stevens noted in his dissent, “[t]he consequences of the majority’s 
construction of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are so bizarre that I cannot believe 
they were intended by Congress.”167 Stevens went so far as to reason 
that the most plausible explanation for this sentencing scheme is 
that Congress simply did not comprehend how LSD is sold.168 He also 
argued that such an interpretation would create sentencing 
                                                                                                                      
 160. See id. at 455-56. 
 161. Id. at 456. 
 162. Id. at 454. 
 163. See id. at 461-62. The dissent quoted Learned Hand and considered this an 
instance where it was not proper to “make a fortress out of the dictionary.” Id. at 476. 
 164. Id. at 454. “Congress adopted a ‘market-oriented’ approach to punishing drug 
trafficking under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount 
of pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence.” Id. at 461. 
 165. Id. at 467. 
 166. Dissenting, Justice Stevens quoted the following: 
 “This is a quilt the pattern whereof no one has been able to discern. The 
legislative history is silent, and since even the Justice Department cannot 
explain the why of the punishment scheme that it is defending, the most 
plausible inference is that Congress simply did not realize how LSD is sold.” 
Id. at 475 (quoting United States. v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, 
J., dissenting)); see also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (“True, there may 
be little in logic to defend the statute’s treatment of LSD; it results in significant disparity 
of punishment meted out to LSD offenders relative to other narcotics traffickers.”). 
 167. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 168. See id. at 475.  
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anomalies and undermine the very uniformity that Congress had 
been striving to attain.169 
 After the Court’s decision in Chapman, family members of 
convicted LSD offenders made impassioned pleas to the Sentencing 
Commission regarding the arbitrary nature of the LSD rule and its 
draconian results.170 After determining that carrier weights vary 
widely and are a poor standard on which to base sentences, the 
Commission amended the guidelines for LSD.171 The amendment 
standardized the per dose weight at 0.4 milligrams regardless of the 
carrier, and the new guideline retroactively applied to offenses 
committed before November 1, 1993.172 This development seemed to 
signify that, to an extent, the system envisioned in the mid 1980s 
was operating as designed. While certainty in sentencing was 
ensured, the Commission was researching and developing a 
“rational, coherent set of punishments.”173 
 But it was not to last. In Neal v. United States,174 the Supreme 
Court resolved a conflict in the Court of Appeals over whether the 
amended Guidelines controlled the LSD weight calculations for the 
purposes of section 841(b)(1).175 The Court determined that even 
though the Sentencing Guidelines state differently, the language of 
section 841(b)(1) requires the trial court to account for the actual 
carrier weight in calculating its sentence.176 While acknowledging the 
Commission’s expertise, the Court held the decision in Chapman was 
still the law, and that principles of stare decisis required adherence 
to their earlier statutory interpretation.177 As Justice Breyer 
commented several years after Neal, “[S]tatutory mandatory 
sentences prevent the Commission from carrying out its basic, 
congressionally mandated task. . . . They will sometimes make it 
impossible for the Commission to adjust sentences in light of factors 
                                                                                                                      
 169. See id. at 468. The dissent was also willing to take a closer look at “mixture and 
substance” as they specifically relate to LSD, and after viewing the legislative history and 
other LSD cases, Stevens determined the majority’s construction was improper, noting 
that “[t]here is nothing in our jurisprudence that compels us to interpret an ambiguous 
statute to reach such an absurd result.” Id. at 476. 
 170. See Bowman, supra note 56, at 32. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 33 n.2. 
 173. Breyer, supra note 40, at 184.  
 174. 516 U.S. 284 (1996); See also, e.g., United States v. Pope, 58 F.3d 1567, 1570 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (following Chapman, 500 U.S. 453); United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 518 
(9th Cir. 1995) (using the amended Guidelines), vacated by 516 U.S. 1105 (1996), on 
remand to 89 F.3d 641 (1996)). 
 175. Neal, 516 U.S. at 296. Through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress 
provided for mandatory minimum sentences based on the weight of the “mixture of 
substance” containing a controlled substance, including LSD. Id. at 289. 
 176. See Neal, 516 U.S. at 289. 
 177. See id. at 290. 
2001]  MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 957 
 
that its research shows to be directly relevant.”178 Thus, the 
Commission today lacks the authority to alter the substantive nature 
of Congress’ statutes, no matter how illogically written or irrational 
the results may be. 
C.   Hydrocodone 
 In Florida, one poorly written sentencing statute—imposing a 
minimum for possession of hydrocodone—led to a particularly harsh 
result. The prescription drug hydrocodone is a semi-synthetic 
narcotic painkiller, similar to codeine, that is found in drugs such as 
Vicodin, Triaminic DH, and Lortab.179 Hydrocodone is the most 
commonly prescribed painkiller in America, accounting for half the 
opiate-based painkillers prescribed annually.180 People who illegally 
use hydrocodone often begin taking the drug for legitimate medical 
purposes, later finding themselves addicted when their prescriptions 
run out.181 Until recently, illegal possession of a small amount of 
hydrocodone routinely resulted in a twenty-five year prison term and 
a $500,000 fine without the chance of parole.182 
 In Florida, as in other jurisdictions, the severity of the penalty 
resulting from an illicit drug charge is largely contingent on the 
schedule or classification of the drug-type and the quantity 
involved.183 Section 893.135, Florida Statutes, states that drug 
trafficking charges—and the resulting weight-triggered mandatory 
minimum sentences—are applicable only to schedule I and schedule 
II substances.184 The illegal possession and distribution of substances 
listed in schedule III, IV, or V carries a lesser sanction and does not 
result in drug trafficking charges.185 
 With the war on drugs raging and prescription drug abuse on the 
rise, the Florida legislature reclassified hydrocodone. Traditionally, 
hydrocodone had been listed as a schedule III drug.186 However, in 
1995 the Florida legislature listed hydrocodone as a schedule II 
                                                                                                                      
 178. Breyer, supra note 40, at 184. 
 179. See PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 121-22, 1831 (51st ed. 1997). 
 180. See Greg Critser, Pill Shaves Off Life’s Edges—At a Price, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 
2000, at 19A, LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File. According to a government survey, 1.6 
million people used hydrocodone and related opiate painkillers recreationally for the first 
time in 1998. See id. 
 181. See Graham Brink, Court Ruling May Ease Penalty for Narcotic, ST. PETE. TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 1999, at 1B, LEXIS, News Library, STPETE File (noting the manner in which the 
Green Bay Packers’ quarterback, Brett Farve, became addicted). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (2000). 
 184. Id.  
 185. See §§ 893.13, 893.135.  
 186. See § 893.03(3)(c)(4). A schedule III drug can be addictive but has currently 
accepted medical uses. See id. § 893.03(3).  
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drug as well.187 A schedule II drug “has a high potential for abuse 
and has a currently accepted but severely restricted medical use.”188 
Hydrocodone is the only substance located in both schedule II and 
III.189 
 Hydrocodone is a schedule III substance if the amount is not more 
than “15 milligrams per dosage.”190 In pill form, hydrocodone is 
usually manufactured and distributed in dosages of five to ten 
milligrams.191 Thus, only illegally manufactured pills would likely be 
in excess of fifteen milligrams per dose. Schedule II hydrocodone is 
defined as “hydrocodone not listed in another schedule.”192 Therefore, 
pills over fifteen milligrams fall under schedule II. Schedule II 
hydrocodone may lead to a trafficking charge, and a first-degree 
felony carrying mandatory minimum sentences and mandatory 
fines.193 But no mandatory minimum sentences apply to Schedule III 
hydrocodone; instead, offenders are sentenced for unauthorized 
possession of a schedule III controlled substance, a third-degree 
felony.194 Therefore, how the drug is classified can have severe 
sentencing ramifications. 
 While the Florida legislature defined Schedule III hydrocodone in 
section 893.03,195 it also went on to describe the substances that are 
susceptible to trafficking charges through section 893.135.196 Section 
893.135(1)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits the sale, purchase, 
manufacture, delivery, or possession of four grams or more of 
hydrocodone or four grams or more of any mixture containing 
hydrocodone.197 The statute continues by providing that a violator 
“commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be known as 
‘trafficking in illegal drugs’” if the requisite four grams or more are 
involved.198 
                                                                                                                      
 187. See id. § 893.03(2); see also Brink, supra note 181; Jamie Malernee, Man Gets 
Reprieve on Drug Charge, ST. PETE. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at Hernando 1, LEXIS, News 
Library, STPETE File. 
 188. FLA. STAT. § 893.03(2) (2000). Florida divides controlled substances into five 
different schedules. Schedule I, which includes heroin and LSD, is the most restrictive 
schedule because the drugs therein have “a high potential for abuse and has no currently 
accepted medical use.” Id. § 893.03(1). Schedule V, the least restrictive schedule, includes 
drugs with “a low potential for abuse relative to the substances in Schedule IV and has a 
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.” Id. § 893.03(5). 
 189. See § 893.03(2)-(3); see also Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999).  
 190. § 893.03(3)(c)(4). 
 191. See PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 121-22 (51st ed. 1997). 
 192. Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999).  
 193. See FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (2000).  
 194. See id. § 893.13(1)(a)(2). 
 195. See id. § 893.03(3)(c)(4) (defining schedule III hydrocodone as not more than 300 
milligrams per 100 milliliters or not more than 15 milligrams per dosage).  
 196. See § 893.135.  
 197. Id. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (emphasis added).  
 198. Id.  
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 Hydrocodone is ordinarily combined with a nonprescription pain 
reliever, such as acetaminophen or aspirin, when manufactured in 
pill form.199 The nonprescription substance usually comprises around 
98% of the pill, while the controlled substance constitutes a small 
fraction of the approximately 750 milligram total pill weight.200 In 
Florida, some prosecutors have centered on the “four grams or more 
of any mixture containing any such substance,” language of section 
893.135(1)(c)(1) and include the acetaminophen in the total drug 
weight when charging defendants with hydrocodone violations.201 
Under this scheme—at 750 milligrams a pill—six pills, or the 
maximum prescribed daily dosage, could net an offender a first-
degree felony trafficking charge.202 Twenty-eight grams, less than the 
weight of a one-week legal prescription, could trigger a felony 
trafficking charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of 
twenty-five years and a $500,000 fine.203 
 One might have thought that prosecutors would exercise their 
charging discretion to reduce the inequitable severity of these 
trafficking sentences; it would not be illogical to conclude that the 
pills fall within the gambit of Schedule III, since the pills contain “15 
milligrams or less per dosage unit.”204 However, given two different 
charging options by the poorly contemplated and confusing statutory 
scheme, prosecutors have decided to levy the more severe charge 
despite the glaringly, disproportionate sentence it would trigger.205 
Violators who telephoned a fraudulent prescription to a pharmacy 
were prosecuted for trafficking and sentenced to twenty-five years, in 
spite of no evidence that they attempted to sell or distribute the 
pills.206 The draconian absurdity in applying this sentence to the 
criminal behavior involved seems indisputably apparent, yet the 
                                                                                                                      
 199. See State v. Dial, 730 So. 2d 813, 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (Klein, J., concurring), 
quashed, 752 So. 2d 555, 555 (Fla. 1999).  
 200. See id. 
 201. See Brink, supra note 181. 
 202. Possession of over four grams results in a mandatory minimum sentence of three 
years and a $50,000 fine. See FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1)(a) (2000). Between 14 and 28 
grams results in a sentence of 15 years and a $100,000 fine. See § 893.135(1)(c)(1)(b). 
 203. See § 893.135(1)(c)(1)(c). The mandatory scheme in section 893.135(1)(c) provides 
for the following sentences: 4 to 15 grams—mandatory imprisonment of three years and a 
$50,000 fine; 14 to 28 grams—mandatory imprisonment of 15 years and a $100,000 fine; 28 
grams to 30 kilograms—mandatory imprisonment of 25 years and a $500,000 fine. 
 204. Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 2 (1999); see also § 893.03(3)(c)(4). Rather than 
employ this definition, prosecutors instead chose to center on the aggregate pill weight 
methodology of the trafficking statute.   
 205. This is a classic example of the common critique of mandatory minimum 
provisions discussed infra: they transfer discretion from neutral judges to adversarial 
prosecutors. See, e.g., VINCENT & HOFER, supra note 2, at 21. 
 206. See Hayes, 750 So. 2d at 2-3 (chronicling earlier hydrocodone decisions); see also 
Brink, supra note 181. 
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state Attorney General’s Office fought for the validity of this 
interpretation all the way to the Florida Supreme Court.207 
 Florida defense attorneys protested the obvious unfair sentencing 
anomaly.208 An individual caught with a one-week personal-use 
supply of hydrocodone was sentenced to the same twenty-five year 
term as someone caught with twenty-eight grams of pure heroin—
even though 98% of their drug weight was acetaminophen!209 The 
cost of this twenty-five year sentence to the taxpayers: about a half 
million dollars.210 Moreover, in Florida, possession of 300 pounds of 
cocaine mandates a fifteen year sentence—ten years less than forty 
pills of hydrocodone.211 A defendant would also have been better off 
with 10,000 pounds of marijuana212—also a fifteen year sentence.213 
 The confusion caused by Florida’s hydrocodone scheme was 
manifest in the trial courts. One circuit court judge, Richard 
Tombrink, refused to impose the mandatory minimum sentence on a 
defendant, ruling the law unconstitutional—something he had never 
done in ten years on the bench.214 He declared the hydrocodone rule 
unconstitutional because of its unclear wording and its “bizarre” 
sentencing ramifications.215 The defendant standing in front of 
Tombrink was Ariel Hernandez, a thirty-seven-year-old man who 
became addicted to the pills after a car crash.216 Hernandez had 
telephoned a pharmacy pretending to be a doctor and prescribed 
himself 100 Vicodin pills—an amount doctors had legally prescribed 
him in the past.217 Hernandez previously had only minor run-ins with 
the law and there was no evidence he tried to sell the pills.218 Judge 
Tombrink stated, “I could not in good conscience sentence him to 25 
years,” and after researching alternatives, he declared the statute 
unconstitutional.219 He added that in addition to being a gross 
miscarriage of justice, the rule was a “gigantic waste of taxpayers’ 
money.”220 
                                                                                                                      
 207. See Hayes, 750 So. 2d at 1.  
 208. See Brink, supra note 181.  
 209. See Hayes, 750 So. 2d at 3.  
 210. The figure is based on a current estimate of $20,000 a year. See Brink, supra note 
181. 
 211. See FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(b)(1)(c) (2000).  
 212. Marijuana is even classified as a schedule I drug. See id. § 893.03(1)(c)(7). 
 213. See § 893.135(1)(a)(3). 
 214. See Jamie Malernee, Judge: Sentence Is Unfair, ST. PETE. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, 
at Hernando 1, LEXIS, News Library, STPETE File.  
 215. Id. 
 216. See Graham Brink, Strict Drug Trafficking Penalties Questioned, ST. PETE. TIMES 
(PASCO TIMES), June 4, 1999, 1999 WL 332462. 
 217. See Malernee, supra note 214. 
 218. See Brink, supra note 216. 
 219. Brink, supra note 216. 
 220. Id. 
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 Predictably, the confusion over hydrocodone surfaced at the 
appellate level as well.221 The Florida district courts of appeal split on 
the issue.222 The Fourth District and the Fifth District upheld the 
“any mixture containing such substance,” aggregate-pill-weight 
interpretation.223 Offenders in these districts were subject to 
trafficking charges and the entire weight of the pill was used to 
determine the applicable mandatory minimum sentence.224 
Conversely, the First and Second District Courts of Appeal held that 
the drug trafficking statute was inapplicable, as it only applied to 
possession of hydrocodone in amounts of fifteen milligrams or more 
per dosage unit.225 Since the pills were “not more than 15 
milligrams,” they met the statutory definition of Schedule III 
hydrocodone; and trafficking charges only apply to schedule I and 
schedule II substance.226 Therefore, in the First and Second Districts 
essentially all pharmacologically manufactured hydrocodone was 
considered a schedule III substance exempt from trafficking 
charges.227 
 The split among the district courts of appeal was settled in the fall 
of 1999 when the Florida Supreme Court decided the case of Kathryn 
Hayes,228 a woman who telephoned a fraudulent prescription for forty 
Lorcet tablets to her local pharmacy. The trial court granted her 
motion to dismiss the trafficking count. On appeal, the Fourth 
District aligned with the Fifth District Court and reinstated the 
trafficking charges.229 In reaching their decision, the Florida 
Supreme Court referenced the concurring opinion of Judge Klein of 
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, who noted the absurdity of the 
hydrocodone sentencing anomaly and emphasized that lenity rules 
require that if a statute “is susceptible to differing constructions, [the 
statute] shall be construed most favorably to the accused.”230 The 
court’s analysis of these factors, coupled with their interpretation of 
the ambiguous statutory language, ended with their unanimously 
embracing the section 893.03 language: pills under fifteen milligrams 
per dosage unit are a schedule III substance and exempt from 
                                                                                                                      
 221. See Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 1 (1999). 
 222. See id.  
 223. State v. Hayes, 720 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (applying the Supreme 
Court’s definition of “mixture” from United States v. Chapman, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)), 
quashed, 750 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999); State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). 
 224. See Hayes, 720 So. 2d at 1095; Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832. 
 225. See State v. Perry, 716 So. 2d 327, 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State v. Holland, 689 
So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).  
 226. Holland, 689 So. 2d at 1269. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 1 (Fla. 1999). 
 229. See State v. Hayes, 720 So. 2d 1095, at 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 
 230. Hayes, 750 So. 2d at 3 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1)). 
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trafficking charges.231 After several confounding years, the penalties 
for possession of hydrocodone were reduced to a seemingly more 
rational level and in line with those of other jurisdictions.232 
 Prior to Hayes, one of the most prevalent arguments against the 
severe interpretation of the hydrocodone statutes was a common 
sense appeal.233 Many thought that it was inconceivable that 
defendants like Ariel Hernandez and Kathryn Hayes were the type of 
individuals the state actually wished to send away for twenty-five 
years at the cost of $500,000 each to the state’s taxpayers.234 The 
presumption was that the statute was merely poorly drafted and the 
consequences were unintended.235 As one reluctantly concurring 
Florida District Court of Appeal Judge remarked, “I question 
whether, when the legislature enacted and amended our drug 
trafficking statute, it recognized how severe the penalties could be . . 
. for illegally possessing a quantity of pain killers which can be 
obtained in one prescription.”236  
 While many heralded the Hayes decision as a triumph of common 
sense that returned a much-needed degree of proportionality to one 
area of Florida’s criminal justice system,237 the Florida legislature 
refuted such common sense contentions in the 2000 legislative 
session. In May 2000, the legislature passed another drug trafficking 
law,238 primarily targeting “designer drugs” such as GHB and 
ecstasy.239 Also included in this bill was the legislature’s response to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes: the bill listed hydrocodone 
solely in schedule II, deleting the schedule III designation from the 
Florida Statutes.240 As a result, hydrocodone defendants in Florida 
are once again subject to twenty-five year sentences for possessing 
forty pills.241 
                                                                                                                      
 231. See id. at 5. 
 232. See, e.g., Sharp v. State, 710 So. 2d 1373, 1373-74 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) 
(overturning 25-year sentence for conspiracy to traffic in Lortab since hyrdocodone is not 
subject to trafficking charges under § 13A-12-231 of the Alabama Code).  
 233. See, e.g., Brink, supra note 181. 
 234. See id.  
 235. This is not an uncommon occurrence. See Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 209-10 
(discussing “mistakes” in mandatory minimum sentence structures). “Mistakes occur when 
mandatory provisions are badly drafted or poorly coordinated with other statutes.” Id. at 
209. 
 236. State v. Dial, 730 So. 2d 813, 813 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (Klein, J., concurring). 
Judge Klein was bound to concur by the fourth DCA’s previously alignment with the “any 
mixture-aggregate pill weight” methodology. Id. 
 237. See, e.g., Brink, supra note 181 (heralding the decision and describing the old rule 
as “draconian” and “insane” and leaving judges “scratching their heads”). 
 238. See Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, ch. 2000-320, 2000 Fla. Laws 3478. 
 239. See id. § 4, 2000 Fla. Laws at 3495-96 (amending FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (2000)). 
 240. See id. 
 241. See § 893.135(1)(c)(1)(c). Attorney General Robert Butterworth subsequently 
issued an emergency rule placing the hydrocodone provisions of the Act on hold after the 
Florida Board of Medicine and the Florida Board of Pharmacy contacted him. See Fla. S. 
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 The Committee Reports on House Bill 2085 did not reference the 
obvious and understandable confusion that existed prior to the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes.242 Instead, it exhibited 
indignation at the Court’s overturning their statutory scheme and 
displayed approval of the harsh “any mixture containing such 
substance” methodology.243 Florida courts had upheld other 
controlled substance statutes involving mixtures in the past.244 Thus, 
the report cited Stanfill v. State245 for the proposition that “the 
legislature is presumed to know existing law when enacting 
statutes.”246 Actually, it appears the change came at the behest of 
Broward County prosecutors, who complained to the legislature 
about the Court’s removal of their heavy-handed leverage.247 The 
Committee declined to comment on the draconian consequences of 
the hydrocodone law or engage in a comparative analysis of 
sentences for other controlled substances.248 So, far from confirming 
the assumptions of many, that the harsh consequences of the scheme 
must have been unintended, the Committee’s report favored the 
harsh interpretations and claimed the results were “presumably” just 
as the legislature had intended.249 
                                                                                                                      
Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 232 (2001) Staff Analysis 6-7 (Mar. 7, 2001) (on file with 
comm.). The medical community pointed out unforeseen ramifications of the law. Id. By 
listing hydrocodone soley as a schedule II drug it became subject to the stricter controls 
contained in the federal requirements concerning schedule II controlled substances. See 21 
C.F.R. 1306. Schedule II substances require a doctor visit for a refill and may only be 
prescribed for one month at a time. The hardship this would create for patients led to the 
Attorney General retaining the schedule III designation pursuant to his emergency 
rulemaking authority uner section 893.055, Florida Statutes. 
 In the 2001 legislative session another hydrocodone bill was passed. Fla. SB 232 (2001). 
This bill keeps the schedule II and III designations of hydrocodone, but amends section 
893.135(1)(c)(1)(c), Florida Statutes, to allow for trafficking charges to be levied when 
schedule III hydrocodone is involved. See Fla. SB 232, § 2 (2001). Therefore, the 2001 bill 
uses a different approach to achieve the result intended by the 2000 lgislation; the court’s 
ruling in Hayes, is undone, and hydrocodone defendants are again subject to trafficking 
charges. Interestingly, the amended statute would expressly reference the previous 
disparate hydrocodone decisions in a new section (7), which would read: 
(7) For the purpose of furhter clarifying legislative intent, the Legislature finds 
that the opinion in Hayes v. State, 760 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999) does not correctly 
construe legislative intent. The Legislature finds that the opinions in State v. 
Hayes, 720 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) and State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1996) correctly construe legislative intent. 
Fla. CS for SB 232, § 2 (2001). 
 242. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crime & Pun., CS for HB 2085 (2000) Staff Analysis 4-5 
(rev. June 21, 2000), Online Sunshine, http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Welcome/index.cfm 
[hereinafter Staff Analysis]. 
 243. Id. 4-5.  
 244. See, e.g., State v. Yu, 400 So. 2d 762, 765 (Fla. 1981) (involving cocaine mixture). 
 245. 384 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1980).  
 246. Staff Analysis, supra note 242, at 4. 
 247. See Bob LaMendola, Pain Pill Law Will Make Patients Pay, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., 
Aug. 6, 2000, at 1B, LEXIS, News Library, SUNSEN File. 
 248. See Staff Analysis, supra note 242, at 4. 
 249. Id. 
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 In a 1999 St. Petersburg Times article on the plight of Ariel 
Hernandez, state Senator Ginny Brown-Waite, whose district 
includes Brooksville, Florida—scene of Hernandez’s trial—
commented on the situation.250 She stated she did not believe that the 
legislature intended the drug trafficking laws to have application 
against users who were not distributing drugs.251 However, she 
noted, “My constituents have told me repeatedly that they want 
tougher charges and sentences for drug dealers,” though she 
admitted, “Obviously, we don’t want to go overboard.”252 
 Nonetheless, Senator Brown-Waite sponsored the Senate versions 
of the latest drug trafficking bills dealing with hydrocodone.253 Co-
sponsorship of a bill reaffirming twenty-five years for forty pills soon 
replaced tempered statements like those relating to the Hernandez 
case.254 The senator was hardly alone; the provisions passed the 
senate and the House unanimously.255 Mandatory minimum 
penalties relating to drugs are overwhelmingly supported by state 
and federal politicians, seemingly regardless of their costs or 
consequences. 
VI.   A FERTILE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING CLIMATE 
A.   Legislative Motives and Mindsets 
 In a recent Nightline, Ted Koppel remarked, “You’d think, since so 
many members of Congress are lawyers as well as politicians, that 
they might have had a hunch or two about the complications of 
mandatory sentencing.”256 Whether involving hydrocodone in Florida, 
federal LSD penalties, or the harsh sentencing of highly attenuated 
“co-conspirators,” examples abound of mandatory minimums—either 
because they are poorly written or over-aggressively construed by 
prosecutors—having results that are seemingly way off target.257 
 Regardless of the mounting evidence indicating that long 
mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent criminals are 
inefficient and often arbitrary, “in the current contentious political 
climate, the political system seems locked in place.”258 Capitalizing on 
                                                                                                                      
 250. See Brink, supra note 216. The Senator is the chairwoman of the Criminal Justice 
Committee. See id.  
 251. See id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. See Fla. SB 2414 (2000); Fla. SB 232 (2001). 
 254. See Fla. SB 2414 (2000); Fla. SB 232 (2001). 
 255. See Vote Report, at http://www.leg.state.fl.us/cgi-bin…/votes/html/HHB208505 
01000365.html (describing the vote report for HB 2085, which was 117:0:3); FLA. H.R. 
JOUR. 1857 (Reg. Sess. 2001) (describing the vote report for SB 232, which was 117:0:3). 
 256. Nightline: Mandatory Sentences (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 30, 1999), 
LEXIS, News Library, ABCNEW File. 
 257. See id.  
 258. Cannon, supra note 1, at 1912. 
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the public’s fear of crime has been an extremely successful political 
tool in the past two decades.259 Politicians know that when running 
for election they cannot go wrong by portraying themselves as “tough 
on crime” and “hard on drugs.”260 Both major political parties 
currently embrace the tough-on-crime mantra.261 This belief leads to 
a general tendency for legislatures not only to vote for mandatory 
minimums, but also to leave them in place—even if they are proven 
to have seemingly unintended results.262 
 This petrifaction is evidenced in Congress’ failure to bring the 
crack cocaine provisions into line with the powder cocaine 
provisions,263 in spite of the support of the attorney general, the drug 
czar, and numerous experts.264 Politicians considering the ample 
advice may also be imagining a thirty-second campaign ad: 
“’Congressman Smith voted to let hundreds of crack dealers out of 
federal prison.’ . . . That can be the end of a campaign.”265 In modern 
politics, it is considered imperative not to concede the “tough on 
crime” high ground to your opponents.266 Such political realities have 
created the “paralysis” in current drug policy.267 
                                                                                                                      
 259. See, e.g., Jonathon Simon, From a Tight Place: Crime, Punishment and American 
Liberalism, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 853, 854-55 (1999) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, 
GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: HOW POLITICS IS DESTROYING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (1995)) (discussing how Presidents Reagan and Bush both were able to 
successfully portray Democrats as soft on crime and woo Democratic voters on this issue—
including Bush’s devastating use of the Willie Horton issue against Michael Dukakis in the 
1988 presidential election). 
 260. See Laura Mansnerus, As Crime Rate Drops, The Prison Rate Rises and the 
Debate Rages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec, 26, 1999, at 14NJ, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File 
(paraphrasing a quote by Ed Martone of the New Jersey Association on Corrections, who 
also added, “What we know works costs money and takes time and doesn’t fit on a bumper 
sticker.”). 
 261. See Simon, supra note 259, at 854-55. 
 262. See Cannon, supra note 1, at 1912 (citing the argument of Eric Sterling, president 
of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation).  
 263. A five-year mandatory minimum sentence is triggered by five grams of crack 
cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (a), while it takes 500 grams of powder cocaine to trigger the same 
five-year sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (B)(ii)(II).  
 264. The disparity in mandatory minimum sentences for crack and powder cocaine in 
the federal system and its disproportionate impact on African-American defendants is 
itself the source of much critical analysis and debate. See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 73, at 
196. For additional material on the disparate impact of mandatory drug sentences on the 
African-American community, see MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS 
LATER 12 (1995) (noting that while 76% of drug users are white, African-Americans 
comprise 35% of all drug arrests, 55% of all drug convictions, and 74% of all drug 
sentences). 
 265. Cannon, supra note 1, at 1912 (containing numerous examples of recent political 
“soft on crime” attack campaigns) (quoting Eric E. Sterling, president of the Criminal 
Justice Policy Foundation). 
 266. See Press Release, Federation of American Scientists, Drug Experts Call for 
“Third Way”—Neither Drug War Nor Legalization (Sept. 2, 1997), http://www.fas.org/ 
press/index.html.  
 267. See id. 
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B.   The Public’s Concerns about Drugs and Crime 
 This ossification within many legislatures is symptomatic of 
society’s views of drugs and drug-related crimes. Americans 
consistently list drugs and crime as major concerns.268 The public 
seems convinced that criminals regularly receive lenient treatment 
and that societal problems can be fixed by taking a tougher stance.269 
Increasing the severity of sentences routinely receives overwhelming 
support from the public—with such measures registering 
approximately 80% approval ratings throughout the 1990s.270 
Consequently, few social problems receive as much political attention 
as crime, and the “lock ‘em up” mentality “resonate[s] deeply with 
the electorate.”271 The war on drugs is often cited as the leading 
example of the politicization of crime in America.272 Therefore, 
politicians may compellingly argue that they are attending to the 
concerns of the citizens by enacting lengthy mandatory terms for 
various penalties. The protection of citizens is certainly established 
as an important governmental goal;273 however, this goal does not 
necessarily support the American justice system’s recent “monolithic 
answer” of lengthy incarceration.274 
 Are the public’s concerns—and the resulting harsh penalties—
warranted? Certainly, a considerable degree of concern for personal 
safety and the safety of loved ones is rational. But ample evidence 
suggests the public’s apprehension about crime is exaggerated. Fear 
of crime is prevalent in areas with crime rates that are relatively 
low.275 Rural citizens in areas with virtually no violent crime often 
list crime as a top concern.276 The suburban, voting population that is 
so concerned about crime experiences comparatively low 
victimization rates.277 Yet the perceived risk from crime and “the 
                                                                                                                      
 268. See Beale, supra note 77, at 44-45. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See id. at 25. 
 271. Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 
1968 (1998). 
 272. See id. at 1985. 
 273. See id. at 1967 (citing John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government).  
 274. See id. at 1866; see also Beale, supra note 77, at 38 (“By themselves, [the crime 
rate] data do not seem sufficient to explain the salience of the fear of crime, and the 
political support for punitive crime policies.”). 
 275. See Beale, supra note 77, at 44-45 (citing a Long Island, New York study, 
according to which 56% of residents said they were less likely to shop after dark now than 
they were 20 years before, even though major crime had fallen 21% during that time period 
and Long Island crime rates are well below the national level). 
 276. See id. at 44. There is a prodigious variation in victimization rates by 
demographic factors, including race, gender, and age. See id. at 37. 
 277. See id. at 39; see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, Why Are We Ignored? The Peculiar 
Place of Experts in the Current Debate About Crime and Justice, 31 CRIM L. BULL. 305, 
318-19 (1995) (“Suburbanites . . . fear crime more than urban dwellers who face much 
greater dangers from crime.”). Pillsbury claims that there may be racial undertones to this 
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deeply rooted pro-incarcerative sentiments of the American public” 
continue to flourish.278 
 There are various accepted explanations for the heightened fear of 
crime.279 Psychological research and analysis on the topic is in 
abundance.280 The public’s “[b]iased [p]rocessing of information” is 
likely partly responsible; once people have made up their minds 
about drugs, crime, and punishment, they are likely to process new 
information on the subject in line with their established beliefs.281 
Additionally, research shows that frequency of repetition is an 
important factor in how important a topic is considered, and the 
evening news consistently furnishes such frequent repetition through 
sensational stories of a crime-laden and drug-infested society.282 
 The effects of media reports on crime has been the focus of much 
research, criticism, and debate.283 The slogan “If it bleeds, it leads” is 
now the theme of television news coverage, evidenced by a dramatic 
increase in violent news stories throughout the 1990s.284 Likewise, in 
the 1980s, the public was bombarded with stories of the raging crack 
“epidemic.”285 Some posit that this media attention has resulted in 
the disproportionately heightened concern over societal ills.286 In 
addition to altering public perceptions, the media is also cited for its 
role in prioritizing crime in the political agenda.287 
                                                                                                                      
phenomenon, as people often fear those different from them, including the urban poor and 
minorities. See Pillsbury, supra, at 319. “Law and order advocates rarely become exercised 
about the economic crimes of middle-class offenders . . . [p]erhaps because white, middle-
class voters represent the most powerful group in U.S. politics.” Id. at 316. 
 278. Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 271, at 1986. 
Now that drugs (and other categories of crimes) have been heavily covered by mandatory 
minimums, the brunt of the politicians’—and the public’s and media’s—concerns appear 
now to be directed at violent youth offenders. See id. at 1988-90. 
 279. See Beale, supra note 77, at 51-64 (summarizing various psychological models).  
 280. See id. 
 281. Id. at 59-60. 
 282. See id. at 46, 59-60. 
 283. See id. at 45-46 (citing both news and entertainment media); see also Pillsbury, 
supra note 277, at 317-18 (discussing the media’s role in the public’s perception of crime). 
 284. Beale, supra note 77, at 45.  
 285. See Stewart, supra note 31, at 39 (“[In the 1980s,] crack cocaine was a new drug 
on the scene. There was a lot in the media, every night almost, about crack babies and the 
crack scare. There were certainly a lot of unknowns about crack cocaine.”). 
 286. See Beale, supra note 77, at 47-49. Though some argue this research is 
incomplete, it is certainly safe to say that “violence is attractive to media consumers.” Id. 
at 48. And the public connects with stories about other people, not with statistics. See 
Pillsbury, supra note 277, at 321. 
 287. See Beale, supra note 77, at 49-51. 
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C.   “Entrenched Camps” in the Drug War—Little Room for a 
Middle Ground 
 Mandatory minimum sentences were envisioned as a valuable 
drug control measure.288 Drugs have long been a major societal 
concern and there is obviously no easy answer to the drug problem. 
An all out “war on drugs” has proven to be costly and inefficient.289 
Those in the opposite camp, who favor legalization of drugs, are 
likely just as mistaken. While drugs and nonviolent crime in general 
impose less costs on society than violent crime, drug use is not a 
“victimless” activity.290 In addition to crime control and incarceration, 
drug use imposes enormous costs on society. Medical costs, lost 
productivity, accidents, and various insurance and social program 
costs constitute a significant toll.291 And, the majority of these costs 
are not borne by the addict, but rather by the nonabusing 
population.292 Removing the negative legal ramifications presently 
enforced against drugs would just increase overall drug 
consumption.293 
 Unfortunately, the current state of our drug policy remains 
entrenched between the two opposite camps of “drug warriors” and 
legalizers.”294 Consequently, many moderate policy proposals that fall 
between the two extremes are not intelligently discussed.295 In 
addition, there is a tendency among many hard line anti-drug 
advocates to consider any proposal not in line with their ideology, as 
starting on the slippery-slope towards legalization.296 
 The current anti-drug camp’s upper hand in current policy is 
certainly evidenced in the harsh mandatory minimum sentences that 
have been politically vogue for the past two decades.297 Nevertheless, 
in spite of a politically inhospitable climate, alternative views 
advocating moderate tenets or “harm reduction” drug policies have 
                                                                                                                      
 288. See, e.g., CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 1.  
 289. See id.  
 290. See HENRICK HARWOOD, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE 
ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992, at 1.8, 7.1 
(National Inst. of Health Pub. No. 98-4327, 1998), http://www.nida.nih.gov/EconomicCosts/ 
Intro.html. 
 291. See id. at 1.8. 
 292. See id. at 1.8, 7.1. 
 293. See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Drugs and Drug Policy: The Case for a Slow Fix, ISSUES 
SCI. & TECHS. (1998), at http://sun00781.dn.net/drugs/slowfix.htm; see also Gary S. Becker, 
et al., Economics of Drugs: Rational Addiction and the Effect of Price on Consumption, 81 
AM. ECON. REV. 237, 237 (1991) (stating that the legalization of drugs would increase 
consumption). 
 294. See Kleiman, supra note 293, at 155. 
 295. See id. 
 296. See Press Release, Federation of American Scientists, supra note 266.  
 297. See Kleiman, supra note 293, at 155.  
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slowly been gaining momentum in response to the perceived 
deficiencies of prevailing approaches.298 
 Inherent in moderate views is the realization that both drugs and 
anti-drug policies may impose costs and aggregate harm on society. 
Public health and harm reduction advocates criticize the current war 
on drugs in the United States on a variety of fronts, including: 
[I]ts moral arbitrariness, its insensitivity to differential 
consequences of drug use, its stigmatization and thereby 
systematic marginalization of drug users, its manufacturing a 
drug-related ‘moral panic’ in society, its straining the criminal-
justice system by turning drug users into criminals, its 
infringement on the civil rights of citizens, its indirect sustenance 
of a black market, and, most important of all, its inability to 
achieve what it promises to achieve—curbing illicit drug 
consumption and availability.299 
Moderate policies and harm reduction encompass a realization that 
the use of mind-altering substances has been with us for thousands 
of years, and—regardless of the billions of dollars spent on the 
problem—such use will not be leaving us in the near future.300 A 
truly “decisive” victory in the drug war is the language of politicians, 
not experts. 
 While harm reduction measures aimed for alcohol and tobacco 
meet with limited opposition,301 opponents abound when the 
measures are applied to illegal drug use within the zero tolerance 
framework of our current system. The divide stems from an inability 
to agree on the degree of harm that is acceptable from illegal drugs 
and ideological differences on the appropriate methods to employ.302 
Needle exchange programs are a prime example of programs that are 
enormously cost-effective yet often vehemently opposed on ideological 
grounds.303 Easy access to detoxification is another method of 
lowering society’s costs when confronted with addicts with a need for 
drugs but without the financial resources to purchase them.304 
                                                                                                                      
 298. See HARM REDUCTION: A NEW DIRECTION FOR DRUG POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 4 
(Patricia G. Erickson et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter HARM REDUCTION] (“To say that the 
search for a harm reduction perspective was a reaction to deficiencies of existing 
approaches is hardly an exaggeration.”); see also Kleiman, supra note 293. 
 299. HARM REDUCTION, supra note 298, at 4. 
 300. See BARRY STIMMEL, MD, THE WAR THAT MUST BE WON 172 (1996). 
 301. See id. at 172-73 (harm reduction techniques range from treatment and 
dependency programs to “designated driver” and “call-a-cab” programs, to designated 
smoking areas and nonsmoking rules). 
 302. See id. at 174. 
 303. See id. at 174-75 (comparing the estimated lifetime costs of treating an HIV 
patient to the cost of averting infection). 
 304. See id. at 174. Of course not all similarly situated addicts would chose this option, 
but the detoxification space should be increased to accommodate demand.  
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Currently, over half those seeking treatment are denied it due to 
financial inability or lack of facility space to accommodate them.305 
 Harm reduction advocates attack mandatory minimum sentences 
as inefficient. They argue mandatory minimums should be 
abandoned in favor of programs that offer greater returns such as 
providing greater access to treatment and shorter, more widespread 
jail sentences for dealers.306 So why haven’t we done this? The answer 
is, as one police chief stated, “Public officials are reluctant to consider 
a variety of potentially helpful steps, from abandoning ineffective 
programs to reforming the sentencing laws, for fear of being labeled 
as pro-legalization or soft on drugs.”307 
 In addition to failing to receive much political support, moderate 
programs are often vehemently attacked. As with all programs 
advocated as an alternative to the current zero-tolerance mind-set, 
conservative policymakers assail the harm reduction movement.308 
They suspect that the hidden agenda of those advocating moderate 
drug policies is the legalization of drugs.309 Barry McCaffrey, 
President Clinton’s Drug Czar, sounded almost paranoid in 
discussing the harm reduction movement: 
[The movement is] a carefully-camouflaged, well-funded, tightly-
knit core of people whose goal is to legalize drug use in the United 
States. It is critical to understand that whatever they say to gain 
respectability in social circles, or to gain credibility in the media 
and academia, their common goal is to legalize drugs.310 
 The driving tenent of moderate drug policies is not legalization. 
Rather, it is the employment of more utilitarian and less damaging 
policy tools against the drug problem, such as prioritizing policy 
based or public health methods over punitive programs.311 Mandatory 
minimum sentences for most drug offenders are far from utilitarian 
in principle. Rather than registering the greatest return for the 
crime control dollar, they often end up “inflicting a great deal of pain 
on many offenders who have committed relatively minor offenses.”312 
They often force the allotment of the societal asset of long-term 
                                                                                                                      
 305. See Marsha Rosenbaum, Are We Really Winning the War on Drugs?, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 24, 2000, at A23, LEXIS, News Library, SFCHRN File.  
 306. See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 85, at 75-76. 
 307. Press Release, Federation of American Scientists, supra note 266. 
 308. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 175 (1999) (“In fact, the ‘harm reduction’ movement has cleverly turned 
the table on the conservative harm arguments, focusing instead on the harms caused by 
the policies prohibiting drug use.”). 
 309. See Barry R. McCaffrey, Legalization Would Be the Wrong Direction, L.A. TIMES, 
July 27, 1998, at B5, LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.  
 310. Harcourt, supra note 308, at 176. 
 311. See id. at 174-75. 
 312. Pillsbury, supra note 277, at 312. 
2001]  MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 971 
 
prison space to nonviolent offenders, while violent offenders who 
were sentenced without a mandatory provision are set free.313 A 
rational justice system should gauge sentencing and allot prison 
space to those criminals who impose the highest costs on society—
and utilize research and analysis in the employment of an efficient 
sentencing system that assures this result. Unfortunately, analysis 
of sentencing policy and the long-term ramifications of mandatory 
sentencing remain largely underutilized in our justice system. 
D.   The Role of Expert Opinions in Sentencing Policy 
 In his 1993 article on sentencing reform in the federal system, 
Senator Orrin Hatch summed up his position by concluding, “Over 
the last decade, Congress has assumed a more active role in the 
federal sentencing system and should continue to do so.”314 But he 
added a word of caution: 
 As the ultimate architects of a sentencing policy that affects the 
liberty interests of defendants and the lives of all citizens, 
congressional policy makers must take advantage of the most 
current and complete information available when making 
legislative decisions. Whenever possible, Congress should 
encourage . . . those most knowledgeable of and most involved with 
the guidelines—judges, prosecutors, practitioners and the 
[Sentencing] Commission—to express their views . . . Congress 
should carefully study and monitor . . . [the] compulsory nature [of 
sentencing schemes].315 
However, it is highly debatable how much credence politicians have 
given to this advice. 
 Analysis of this public policy and employment of criminal justice 
experts plays an extraordinarily limited role in the design of criminal 
sentencing policy.316 Politicians commonly employ financial experts 
and economists in monetary policy decisions; and diplomats, 
intelligence, and military experts are essential to foreign policy.317 
Yet, politicians ignore and underutilize criminal justice experts in 
the development of sentencing and crime initiatives.318 Instead, the 
                                                                                                                      
 313. The most notorious and publicized example of this was the Polly Klass murder in 
California. Her killer was released from prison early due to overcrowding caused in part by 
mandatory drug penalties. See id. at 311. 
 314. Hatch, supra note 21, at 198. 
 315. Id. at 197-98. 
 316. See Doris Marie Provine, Reflections on the International Conference on 
Sentencing and Society, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 178, 178 (1999) (“As our politicians 
concentrate on being popular by being tough, sentencing professionals of all persuasions 
are more and more marginalized. At this point the two groups are hardly on speaking 
terms.”); see also Pillsbury, supra note 277, at 313 (discussing reasons for this limited role 
and potential reactions by experts to help reverse this trend). 
 317. See Pillsbury, supra note 277, at 313. 
 318. See id.  
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widespread passage of mandatory minimums has turned sentencing 
into a political function, as legislators seek to shore up their public 
image by assuaging the public’s fears through strong sentencing 
laws. The extent to which this occurs is uniquely American.319 
 The American system of formulating criminal justice policy differs 
greatly from that of many other countries.320 Canada, England, and 
other European countries employ divergent policies to combat crime, 
while the United States favors a nearly “exclusively punitive model 
with increasingly harsher sanctions.”321 Many foreign systems exhibit 
a greater realization that criminal sanctions have only a modest 
deterrent effect.322 They also rely on a “tradition of empirical research 
as a guide to criminal justice” instead of the political-moral 
condemnation inherent in American policy.323 
 Our system is replete with criminal justice policies that are 
“contrary to what almost everyone with close knowledge of the topic 
thinks makes sense.”324 This contradiction is evident in the expert 
opinions regarding long mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offenses; such sentences are deemed fundamentally flawed and are 
almost unanimously considered contrary to expert opinion.325 
Interestingly, one of the most frequently cited experts among the 
harsh-sentencing advocates, Princeton Professor John J. DiIulio, 
recently changed his position with respect to nonviolent offenders.326 
Professor DiIulio, who wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal in 
1994 with the catchy title “Let ‘em Rot,” now feels that “Two Million 
Prisoners Are Enough.”327 
 The criticism of the current lengthy prison durations is primarily 
limited to nonviolent and drug offenses.328 Importantly, for dangerous 
and violent offenders, the sentences emanating from an empirically 
based sentencing system would likely be similar to the current 
                                                                                                                      
 319. See Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 271, at 
1866. 
 320. See id.; see also Provine, supra note 316, at 178-79. 
 321. Beale, supra note 77, at 29. 
 322. See id.  
 323. Id.; see also Provine, supra note 316, at 179 (“There appears to be a working 
relationship between researchers, court administrators, and legislators, in most of the 
[European] countries represented at this conference.”). 
 324. Beale, supra note 77, at 23. 
 325. See id. at 25 (“There are a few criminal justice experts who support harsher 
sentences, but they are in the distinct minority.”). 
 326.  See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 
1999, at A14, LEXIS, News Library, WSJ File [hereinafter DiIulio, Two Million Prisoners]; 
John J. DiIulio, Jr., Let ‘Em Rot, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1994, at A14, LEXIS, News Library, 
WSJ File.  
 327. DiIulio, Two Million Prisoners, supra note 326.  
 328. See, e.g., Provine, supra note 316, at 179.  
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scheme.329 In contrast, with most drug offenses, the sanctions would 
likely be drastically different.330 
 There has long been a plethora of experts declaring opposition to 
mandatory minimums. The Sentencing Commission, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the Federal Courts Study 
Commission, the Federal Judicial Center, the ABA, and an 
overwhelming majority of judges oppose mandatory minimums.331 
Even three current Supreme Court Justices have publicly spoken out 
against these penalties.332 Even among prosecutors, who are 
currently empowered with wide discretion under mandatory 
minimums, only half viewed these provisions in a favorable light.333 
 Additionally, some argue that certain areas of governmental 
policy should not be overly guided by public opinion.334 Public 
attitudes on risk can be highly skewed from reality. Justice Breyer 
has compellingly contended that in certain fields, cognitive errors 
create a public perception on risk so fundamentally flawed it should 
not be the basis for public policy.335 Crime, and the resulting criminal 
justice decisions, are an area fueling highly emotional, and arguably 
irrational, public reactions. Considering that policy determinations 
affect the liberty interests of defendants, basing criminal justice 
policy on empirical research seems favorable to public-driven and 
politically motivated measures.336 
                                                                                                                      
 329. See id. 
 330. See id. 
 331. See Beale, supra note 77, at 27; cf. Breyer supra note 40, at 184 (“The 
Commission, from the beginning, has strongly opposed mandatory minimums.”).  
 332. See Breyer, supra note 40, at 184. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and 
Justice Breyer have all publicly spoken out against mandatory minimums. See Id.  
 333. See Schulhofer, supra note 63, at 216-17 (noting that not all prosecutors 
disfavored them solely on the harshness of the sentence). 
 334. For a comprehensive accounting of the public’s opinions regarding crime and 
punishment, see Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and 
Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2000), which summarizes numerous public opinion 
studies on crime and punishment.  
 335. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 59-81 (1993) (arguing primarily in the context of environmental risk); see also 
Beale, supra note 77, at 65 (paraphrasing Justice Breyer’s sentiments on the issue). But 
see Beale, supra note 77, at 65 n.157 (stating that some would consider Justice Breyer’s 
opinions “elitist”). 
 336. See Cullen et al., supra note 334, at 3. The authors expressed the following 
concern:  
One immediate concern is whether public opinion should be the arbiter of 
sentencing and correctional policies. Public sentiments on policy issues must be 
accorded some weight in a democratic society, but justifying policies on the 
basis of what citizens want confronts a dismaying reality: much of the public—
in the United States and elsewhere—is ignorant about many aspects of crime 
and its control.  
Id. However, there are those who believe that the appropriate source of criminal justice 
policy lies with our elected politicians. Relegating criminal justice decisions to experts may 
raise complaints that it is undemocratic and elitist. See Beale, supra note 77, at 65 n.157. 
It may also be argued that in a democracy—given certain constitutional limitations—a 
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 Scientific, policy-based methodology in criminal justice and drug 
control will likely continue to be underutilized, at least as long as the 
current conservative line on drugs is in vogue among politicians. Yet, 
as the evidence mounts, there are examples of political and public 
retreats from ultra-hard-line stances.337 But the establishment of a 
climate reasonably hospitable to changes in sentencing is requisite 
for wholesale changes to occur.338 
 Politicians will likely begin modifying disproportionate drug laws 
only if they are afforded “adequate cover against the dreaded charge 
of being ‘soft on drugs.’”339 When extensive social, medical, and 
scientific support is mustered, policymakers may be more willing to 
accept a slower, more realistic set of policies.340 The compilation of 
such information continues, and if it adequately affects the public 
and political conscious, changes will occur.341 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Sentencing policy has become much more of a function of politics 
instead of the discriminating and careful analysis envisioned by 
Senator Hatch.342 Rather than resulting from meticulous empirical or 
legislative scrutiny, mandatory minimums often evolve without any 
legislative debate. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted, mandatory 
minimums “frequently . . . do not involve any careful consideration;” 
rather, they “are frequently the result of floor amendments to 
                                                                                                                      
society has a “moral right to punish” in accordance with the values and opinions of the law 
abiding majority. E.g., Ronald J., Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further 
Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 337-38 (1990). 
 337. See Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, supra note 271, at 
1900-19 (discussing various programs that are proposed, and to a degree being 
implemented, to sanction and rehabilitate nonviolent drug offenders); Families Against 
Mandatory Minimums, supra note 5 (discussing the “safety-valve” provisions of 1994—the 
true value of which is highly debated); see also Mark Hansen, Mandatories Going, Going . . 
. Gong: Support for Minimum Drug Sentences Hits New Low, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1999, at 14. 
 338. See generally Pillsbury, supra note 277, at 305 (commenting on the role of experts 
in furnishing that philosophical adjustment). 
 339. Kleiman, supra note 293. 
 340. See id.  
 341. For example, in the fall of 1997 a varied group of 34 scientists, treatment and 
medical experts, law enforcement officials, and drug policy experts offered a set of 
“Principles for Practical Drug Policies,” released by the Drug Policy Project of the 
Federation of American Scientists. Those principles advocate “that drug policies should be 
designed to minimize both the damage done by drugs and the damage created by drug 
control measures.” Press Release, Federation of American Scientists, supra note 266 
(emphasis added). A stated goal of the Drug Policy Project was to help create an 
atmosphere where scientific research and expert opinions in the field of drug abuse can be 
considered by elected officials. See Kleiman, supra note 293 (discussing the Drug Policy 
Project and “Principles for Practical Drug Policies”). 
 342. See Hatch, supra note 21, at 197-98. 
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demonstrate emphatically that legislators want to ‘get tough on 
crime.’”343 
 The indeterminate sentencing system certainly may have been 
problematic and raised legitimate concerns that were confronted by 
state and federal legislatures seeking a practical solution.344 Yet, the 
compiled evidence lends credence to Justices Breyer and Kennedy, 
judges across America, and the litany of experts who have noted that 
an exhaustive, objective analysis, if not an outright repeal, of 
mandatory minimum sentencing is in order.345 When an addicted 
individual is sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for possession 
of forty pills, it demonstrates that “[s]ome things are worse than 
sentencing disparity, and we have found them.”346 Such sentiments 
signal that it is time for legislators to step back from their recent 
power-grab for sentencing authority and “examine whether the most 
effective way of addressing these problems is to return a greater 
degree of flexibility to the judiciary.”347 Or legislators could leave 
state and federal sentencing policy in the hands of sentencing 
commissions or a body of experts who are adequately insulated from 
the political pressures and campaign promise considerations 
affecting our legislators. 
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